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I. INTRODUCTION
“As for other Americans, life for people with disabilities involves striving,
working, taking risks, failing, teaming, and overcoming obstacles.”1 The
ability to work is an essential part of the American experience.2 To guarantee
persons with disabilities a place in the American workforce,3 Congress
enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).4
Yet, despite the ADA, mentally disabled individuals continue to endure
discrimination in employment.5 Studies show “that mental disabilities are

1. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF
FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES—WITH LEGISLATIVE
RECOMMENDATIONS (1986), https://ncd.gov/publications/1986/February1986#5 [https://perma.cc/
JVD6-3YA6].
2. See id. (“We have all had the experience of seeking something that eludes us, of
trying to reach a goal that seems to dance just out of reach. Most of us have also had the rewarding
experience of surmounting obstacles to achieve a goal or accomplish a task, succeeding
even though someone else or even we ourselves doubted we could do it.”).
3. Employers have a duty to offer reasonable accommodations for persons with
disabilities so that they can take part in the American economy. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at
10 (1988).
4. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
5. For example, in 2012, the “national unemployment rate for individuals receiving
public mental health services [was] approximately 80 percent.” Mental Illness: NAMI Report
Deplores 80 Percent Unemployment Rate; State Rates and Ranks Listed—Model Legislation
Proposed, NAMI (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.nami.org/Press-Media/Press-Releases/2014/
Mental-Illness-NAMI-Report-Deplores-80-Percent-Une [https://perma.cc/8EL7-M6AJ]. In
California, that statistic was a staggering 90%. Id. These statistics are distressing because
“[w]ork is tied to a person’s sense of identity, dignity and worth in our society. Even
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the most negatively perceived of all disabilities.”6 The “single biggest
issue” facing mentally disabled persons may be the ability to find and maintain
employment.7
The ADA has failed to create a clear way for employers to accommodate
the needs of persons with mental disabilities. Mental disabilities, as opposed
to physical disabilities, are not always obvious.8 Uncertainty about whether
an individual has a mental disability creates a potential catch-22 of liability
for employers. If an employer fails to provide reasonable accommodations
for a person with disabilities, an employer can be held liable under the ADA.9
But if an employer initiates the process of providing an accommodation to an
employee, the employer could also face liability under the ADA for “regarding”
that employee as “disabled.”10 As the number of mental diagnoses steadily

during the recession, the national unemployment rate paled next to what people in the
public mental health system routinely experience. We must do better.” Id. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics’ recent report on disability and employment statistics has neglected to
differentiate between physical and mental disabilities. However, in total, a whopping 81%
of persons with disabilities were unemployed in 2019. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
USDL-20-0339, PERSONS WITH A DISABILITY: LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS—2019
(2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/disabl.htm [https://perma.cc/U7S8-R2TV].
6. Michael L. Perlin, “I Ain’t Gonna Work on Maggie’s Farm No More:” Institutional
Segregation, Community Treatment, the ADA, and the Promise of Olmstead v. L.C., 17 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 53, 63 (2000). Perception is critical because in many ways “perception functions
as a source of knowledge,” which dictates social interaction. Olli Lagerspetz, Studying
Perception, 83 PHILOSOPHY 193, 197 (2008).
7. Wendy F. Hensel, People with Autism Spectrum Disorder in the Workplace: An
Expanding Legal Frontier, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 73, 75 (2017) (quoting JUDITH
BARNARD ET AL., NAT’L AUTISTIC SOC’Y, IGNORED OR INELIGIBLE? THE REALITY FOR
ADULTS WITH AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS 18 (2001)); see also Michael Edward Olsen,
Jr., Note, Disabled but Unqualified: The Essential Functions Requirement as a Proxy for
the Ideal Worker Norm, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1485, 1488 (2015). More than thirty years after
passage of the ADA, only 19.3% of persons with disabilities are employed. BUREAU OF
LAB. STAT., USDL-19-1735, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—SEPTEMBER 2019 tbl.A-6 (2019),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_10042019.pdf [https://perma.cc/97E9NYV8]. This statistic is troubling because it may reflect a much deeper meaning: overall
life satisfaction. In other words, employment status is often used as a key indicator of life
satisfaction. See generally Nabil Khattab & Steve Fenton, What Makes Young Adults
Happy? Employment and Non-Work as Determinants of Life Satisfaction, 43 SOCIOLOGY
11 (2009) (studying the relationship between employment status and life satisfaction for
1100 individuals).
8. See infra Section III.A.
9. See infra Section II.C.1.
10. See infra Section II.C.2.
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increases,11 so too does potential liability for employers.12 The net result: the
ADA will fail to protect persons with mental disabilities.13
Employers need better tools than the ADA currently affords to help
mentally disabled employees. The current approach to employer liability
under the ADA presumes that employers intentionally discriminate or
choose not to offer reasonable accommodations. Further, the approach
disregards common sense notions that employers have the incentive to
ensure their entire workforce is successful—not just nondisabled employees.14
Clarifying that employee disclosure of a disability would explicitly trigger
the employer’s duty to initiate the interactive process would encourage
employers’ efforts to be proactive, benefitting both employers and mentally
disabled employees.15 Without changes to the ADA, persons with mental
disabilities will continue to miss out on the full benefits of employment.16
Currently, Title I of the ADA imposes an affirmative duty on employers
to engage in an “interactive process” with an employee to determine a
reasonable accommodation for the employee’s disability.17 This duty is
“triggered” when employers know or have a reason to know that an employee
has a mental disability under the ADA and therefore needs a reasonable
accommodation.18 An employee does not need to explicitly initiate the
11. See infra Section III.A.1.
12. See infra Section III.A.3.
13. See infra Section III.A.
14. Savvy employers aim to please their entire workforce because happy employees
increase their productivity, which leads to more profits. See Shawn Achor, The Happiness
Dividend, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 23, 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/06/the-happiness-dividend
[https://perma.cc/K59W-N72M] (“A decade of research proves that happiness raises nearly
every business and education outcome: raising sales by 37%, productivity by 31%, and
accuracy on tasks by 19% . . . .”); Andrew Chamberlain, 6 Studies Showing Satisfied Employees
Drive Business Results, GLASSDOOR (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.glassdoor.com/research/
satisfied-employees-drive-business-results/ [https://perma.cc/7843-5XRY] (“A powerful
lesson has emerged: Employees who are more satisfied—who feel like their job is rewarding,
see an upward career path, and have great managers—clearly drive better financial performance
for companies.”); Samuel Edwards, Examining the Relationship Between Workplace Satisfaction
and Productivity, INC. (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.inc.com/samuel-edwards/examiningthe-relationship-between-workplace-satisfaction-and-productivity.html [https://perma.cc/
Q65R-HCRN] (“[A]n increase in job satisfaction is directly related to a 6.6 percent increase in
productivity per hour.”).
15. See infra Section IV.B.1.
16. See infra Section III.B.
17. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Therefore,
we join explicitly with the vast majority of our sister circuits in holding that the interactive
process is a mandatory rather than a permissive obligation on the part of employers under
the ADA . . . .”), vacated, 535 U.S. 391 (2002)); see also Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist.,
184 F.3d 296, 315 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding employer’s duty is triggered “[o]nce the employer
knows of the disability and the employee’s desire for accommodations . . . .”).
18. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171–72 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding
employer’s duty to engage in interactive process is triggered when employee “convey[s]
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process by disclosing a disability or requesting an accommodation.19
Failure to initiate an interactive process can make an employer liable for
failure to accommodate.20 At the same time, an employer can also be held
liable for discriminating against an employee if the employer “regards”
an employee as having a mental disability.21
This leaves employers whipsawed: employers currently may face liability
for failure to trigger the interactive process, or, if they do initiate an interactive
process, potential liability for regarding an employee as disabled.22 This
catch-22 needs to be addressed so that employers can provide their employees
with effective accommodations.23 This might be accomplished through
agency guidance; however, although the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has the power to enforce the ADA,24 courts treat its
guidelines as merely “persuasive” and not binding.25 Additionally, although
to the employer a desire to remain with the company despite his or her disability”); Bultemeyer
v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996) (“But properly participating in
the interactive process means that an employer cannot expect an employee to read its mind
and know that he or she must specifically say ‘I want a reasonable accommodation,’ particularly
when the employee has a mental illness.”); see also Small Employers and Reasonable
Accommodation, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/
facts/accommodation.html [https://perma.cc/K6ZE-CV8N] (last updated Dec. 20, 2017)
(explaining that when requesting accommodation, “[a]n individual may use ‘plain English’ and
need not mention the ADA or use the phrase ‘reasonable accommodation’”).
19. See, e.g., Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285; Small Employers and Reasonable
Accommodation, supra note 18.
20. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012); see,
e.g., Barnett, 535 U.S. at 396 (“[T]he ADA says that ‘discrimination’ includes an employer’s
‘not making reasonable accommodations . . . .’”).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (2012); see, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630
(1998).
22. See infra Section II.C.
23. See generally JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (50th anniversary ed. 1989); see also
Catch-22, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/catch-22 [https://
perma.cc/WRP8-N8SR] (defining catch-22 as “a problematic situation for which the only
solution is denied by a circumstance inherent in the problem or by a rule”).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2012); see also About EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ [https://perma.cc/H2VX-NRUF]; Disability
Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/
types/disability.cfm [https://perma.cc/4XMW-63DB] (listing ADA as an EEOC-enforced
law).
25. The EEOC routinely administers administrative guidelines to aid in federal
employment law enforcement, such as the ADA; however, the courts do not consistently
defer to the agency’s guidelines. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
482 (1999) (declining to defer to EEOC’s interpretation of ADA as adopted by agency’s
guidelines), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
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courts have played an instrumental role in interpreting the interactive
process’s trigger, circuits inconsistently apply the ADA.26 An effective
solution, therefore, will require Congress to amend the ADA once again
and reconcile this circuit split.27
This Comment proposes solutions to help ensure persons with mental
disabilities are supported in the workplace and will proceed in the following
manner. Part II examines the historical background of the ADA and the
employer’s role and duties under the ADA.28 This Part also briefly describes
the elements of a “failure to accommodate” claim and a “regarded as” claim.29
Part III explores the current trend of ADA mental disability claims and
explains how the current ADA limits employers to “reactive”—rather than
proactive—solutions.30 This reactive approach only confuses employers
and inhibits the assimilation of persons with mental disabilities into the
workplace.31 Finally, Part IV recommends how Congress can amend the
ADA to require employees to disclose their disabilities to their employers
before an employer can be held liable for failing to accommodate an individual’s
disability.32 Requiring an employee to disclose a mental disability to an
employer gives the employer a clear signal to engage in an interactive process
with the employee to find an effective accommodation.33 Additionally,
Congress should prohibit plaintiffs from pleading in the alternative with
respect to failure to accommodate and regarded as discrimination claims.34
These relatively small changes to the ADA will make it easier for employers
and employees to work together, which will help to integrate qualified persons
with mental disabilities into the workplace.
II. A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE ADA
In 1990, Congress passed the ADA, finding that “some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number

122 Stat. 3554; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (explaining Chevron deference as “[t]he power of an administrative agency to
administer a congressionally created . . . program, [which] necessarily requires the formulation
of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress”
(quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))).
26. See infra notes 76–89 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Sections II.A., II.B.
29. See infra Section II.C.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra Section IV.B.1.
34. See infra Section IV.B.2.
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is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older.”35 Initially,
courts narrowly construed the ADA’s scope of protection and held that
several mental illnesses, such as bipolar disorder, were not covered by the
ADA. 36 As a result, Congress amended the ADA in 2008, expressly
admonishing courts for interpreting the Act narrowly.37
Congress intended the 1990 ADA enactment and 2008 ADA amendments
to promote equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities.38 This Part
examines the historical progression of the ADA,39 the employer’s role
under the ADA,40 and the elements establishing failure to accommodate
and regarded as discrimination claims.41
A. A Brief History of the ADA
Under the first version of the ADA, enacted in 1990, persons with
mental disabilities were commonly denied protected status under the ADA.42
After nearly two decades of backlash, Congress introduced amendments

35. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2008) (amended
2009).
36. See, e.g., Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 766–67
(10th Cir. 2006) (holding cerebral palsy outside scope of ADA); Blanks v. Sw. Bell
Commc’ns, Inc., 310 F.3d 398, 399 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding HIV infection outside scope
of ADA); Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 194 F.3d 1084, 1085 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding
multiple sclerosis outside scope of ADA); Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp.
2d 350, 357–58 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding bipolar disorder outside scope of ADA); Hirsch
v. Nat’l Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977, 980–82 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding cancer outside
scope of ADA). See generally Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall
for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 108 (1999) (finding 94% of employers won
ADA claims at trial court level).
37. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(1), (4), 122 Stat.
3553, 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)) (“[I]n enacting the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Congress intended that the Act ‘provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities’ and provide broad coverage. . . . [T]he holdings of the Supreme Court . . .
have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus
eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect . . . .”). The
amended ADA thus reinstated “a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA.”
Id. § 2(b)(1).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
39. See infra Section II.A.
40. See infra Section II.B.
41. See infra Section II.C.
42. See Allison Duncan, Defining Disability in the ADA: Sutton v. United Airlines,
Inc., 60 LA. L. REV. 967, 968 (2000); see also infra Section II.A.1.
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that grossly broadened the ADA’s scope.43 Without a clear trigger to the
interactive process, however, this expanded category of ADA-protected
individuals is unable to fully realize their statutorily protected rights to
reasonable accommodations.44 This is why employers should be given an
opportunity to engage in the interactive process with a straightforward
trigger for the interactive process.45
1. ADA Enactment in 1990
When first enacted in 1990,46 the ADA prohibited employers from
discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability47 and was
“the first statute to prohibit discrimination based on disability in the private
sector.”48 The ADA supplied persons with disabilities with a cause of
action for traditional forms of discrimination, as well as for an employer’s
failure to make reasonable accommodations.49 Congress required employers
to make reasonable accommodations so that persons with disabilities could
“be part of the economic mainstream of our society.”50

43. See infra Section II.A.2.
44. See infra Section III.C.
45. See infra Section IV.B.1.
46. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). Prior to the ADA’s
enactment, disabled individuals were protected under the Rehabilitation Act. Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (2012)). Additionally, many states had already enacted similar laws. See Alex Long,
State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 628 (2004) [hereinafter Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law
as a Model] (“By 1990, the number of states that explicitly included a reasonable accommodation
requirement in their statutes had grown to twenty-seven.”). However, “even though many
states prohibited discrimination against individuals with disabilities prior to the enactment
of the ADA in 1990, state laws were far from uniform and frequently provided less protection
than that ultimately provided by the ADA.” Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the
Track . . .”: Divergent Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination
Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 477–78 (2006) [hereinafter Long, Divergent Interpretations]
(footnotes omitted).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
48. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Special Treatment Stigma After the ADA Amendments
Act, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 213, 219 (2016) (citing RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM:
THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 19 (2005)). The reason the
legislation focused on the term “disability” was because “handicap” had a negative connotation in
American culture. See Malinda Orlin, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Implications
for Social Services, 40 SOC. WORK 233, 234 (1995).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
50. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 10 (1988). The Senate Report notes: “Individuals with
disabilities experience staggering levels of unemployment and poverty,” and “a large majority
of those not working say that they want to work.” Id. at 9. Yet still, once they entered the
workplace, one of the “major categories of job discrimination faced by people with disabilities
include[s] . . . failure to provide or make available reasonable accommodations.” Id.
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Yet, courts were leery of a statute that imposed such broad and affirmative
obligations on employers. Consequently, courts narrowly construed the
definition of “disability.”51 Courts worried that it would be too difficult
for them to determine what a reasonable accommodation is for each unique
type of job, employer, and industry.52
A number of reasons helped pave the way for this judicial backlash.
Congress had not faced much opposition when it enacted the legislation
in 1990.53 Most states had already enacted state antidiscrimination laws
regarding disability,54 several Congressmen had personal connections to
disabled individuals,55 and Congress enacted the ADA at a time when the
legislative branch “was largely receptive to the demands of civil rights
groups.”56 Because Congress faced little opposition to the ADA, Congress
did not have to engage the public about the scope of its protections and
the kinds of costs and tradeoffs that it—like all legislation—would entail.57

51. See Porter, supra note 48, at 220 (“In other words, if the plaintiff never proceeds
past the coverage question, the court never has to answer the more difficult question of whether
the plaintiff should succeed on the merits, which often involves an issue of whether the
employer is obligated to provide a reasonable accommodation to the employee.” (citing
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 47
GA. L. REV. 527, 542 (2013))).
52. See id. at 219–20 (“[C]ourts’ reluctance to make employers broadly restructure
a job or the physical workspace and the difficulty in determining what accommodations
are reasonable has [likely] contributed to courts narrowly construing the definition of disability.”
(citing Porter, supra note 51, at 542)).
53. See Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the
Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 522, 522 n.3 (2008).
54. See Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model, supra note 46, at 627
(“[B]y the time of the ADA’s enactment in 1990, forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia had statutes prohibiting disability-based discrimination in the private sector.”).
55. See Selmi, supra note 53, at 538–39.
56. Id. at 539. For a comparison between the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADA,
see generally Robert D. Dinerstein, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Progeny of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, HUM. RTS., Summer 2004, at 10.
57. See Selmi, supra note 53, at 541–42. The ADA passed into legislation relatively
easily:
Of all the civil rights statutes that were passed towards the end of the decade,
the ADA was perhaps the least controversial. The Family and Medical Leave
Act was vetoed twice by President Bush; the Civil Rights Act of 1990 was
likewise vetoed, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was headed for a veto until the
Clarence Thomas hearings intervened. As a consequence, all of these statutes received
more congressional attention, and more legislative massaging, than the ADA.
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Consequently, Congress did not have to persuade the American public or
various interest groups about the need to protect persons with diverse
disabilities from discrimination or to extend to them the novel right of
reasonable accommodation.58
This judicial backlash59 effectively limited the number of mental disabilities
protected under the ADA.60 A number of appellate courts denied plaintiffs’
claims based on mental disabilities, concluding that mental disabilities, such
as post-traumatic stress disorder and depression, were not substantially
limiting enough to be protected under the ADA.61 In 2002, the Supreme
Court again limited the scope of plaintiffs with ADA-protected disabilities
when the Court interpreted the ADA’s “substantially limited” language as
“severely restrict[ed]” in regards to the ability to perform major life
functions.62

Id. (footnotes omitted). “[L]ack of controversy, however, can just as easily lead to problems
during the implementation phase of the statute—problems that might have been addressed
through more careful congressional deliberation.” Id. at 539.
58. Id. at 543 (“Given the apparent limited support for an expansive definition, it is
worth noting that the public advocacy that did occur in support of the statute all focused on
traditional disabilities.”). In other words, there was “no apparent public support for an expansive
definition of disability.” Id. at 542.
59. The critical backbone of the judicial backlash began in 1999 with the Sutton
trilogy. See Porter, supra note 48, at 220. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Acts of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3554; Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 518–
19 (1999); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 558 (1999).
60. See, e.g., Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350, 350–51, 354,
358 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting summary judgment for employer-defendant against plaintiff
diagnosed with bipolar disorder because, although bipolar disorder “can constitute an
impairment,” impairment does not necessarily constitute ADA-protected disability). Perhaps
this result was because, at the time, “much of the larger disagreement over the Americans
with Disabilities Act [could] be characterized as a clash of perspectives about the meaning
of disability.” Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 213 (2000). “[U]nderlying assumptions about disability
frame[d] the . . . debate over the ADA.” Id.
61. See, e.g., Rohan v. Networks Presentations L.L.C., 375 F.3d 266, 276 (4th Cir.
2004). The Rohan court observed the plaintiff experienced about thirty sporadic episodes,
which rendered the plaintiff “almost completely incapable of interacting with others during
her episodes.” Id. However, the court stated that, “[i]ntermittent manifestations of an illness
are insufficient to establish a substantial limitation on a major life activity.” Id.; see also
Ogborn v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 881, 305 F.3d 763, 767–
78 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding employee not disabled under ADA for suffering from depression
because plaintiff had not shown how depression substantially limited work performance);
Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307, 316 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding depressed surgical
resident “impaired . . . by his depression but not substantially limited”).
62. Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002), superseded by statute,
ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3554; see also Hensel, supra
note 7, at 80.
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In sum, under the 1990 ADA, plaintiffs met the definition of an “individual
with a disability” only if they had a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limited a major life activity, had a record of such impairment, or
was regarded as having such an impairment.63 This narrow reading of
disability undermined the ADA’s purpose because courts easily determined
that plaintiffs did not meet the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination,
and thus courts commonly dismissed ADA claims at summary judgment.64
As a result, “[o]nly those with the most severe disorders, who correspondingly
were the least likely to be employed, were able to establish” that they had
disabilities.65 Plaintiffs with social difficulties common to many mental
disabilities, such as the reduced ability to interact with others, were typically
considered not disabled.66 Courts dismissed plaintiffs with mental disabilities
that were not substantially limiting enough to be qualified under the ADA.67
For example, at summary judgment, courts habitually dismissed plaintiffs
who had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, severe anxiety, and
depression.68 Statistically, only 7% of ADA plaintiffs survived summary

63. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 3(2), 104 Stat.
327, 330 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990) (amended 2002)).
64. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 48, at 219 (“[P]rior to the ADAAA, the courts
narrowly interpreted the definition of disability, which resulted in a very restricted class
of those who were entitled to protection of the ADA.”). For examples of courts dismissing
ADA claims at summary judgment, see infra note 68.
65. Hensel, supra note 7, at 80.
66. See id. at 81–82; see also Comber v. Prologue, Inc., No. CIV.JFM–99–2637,
2000 WL 1481300, at *2, *6 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2000) (holding plaintiff with autism not
disabled).
67. Hensel, supra note 7, at 82. “Ironically, many of the same courts that rejected
interacting with others as a major life activity concluded that ‘getting along with others’
was an essential function of nearly every job.” Id. “Courts also found the ability to handle
stressful situations without upsetting others to be a critical and universal job function.”
Id.; see Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 86 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding employee diagnosed
with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), prone to outbursts during stressful
situations, unqualified under ADA)).
68. See, e.g., Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350, 353–54, 358
(N.D.N.Y. 2000); see also McCarron v. British Telecom, No. 00-CV-6123, 2002 WL
1832843, at *9–10 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 7, 2002) (declining to consider bipolar disorder as
disability under ADA and instead relying on whether morbid obesity was disability); Doebele
v. Sprint Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1200, 1212 (D. Kan. 2001) (holding plaintiff diagnosed
with bipolar disorder and ADHD deemed not disabled under ADA), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 342 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2003); Lottinger v. Shell Oil Co., 143 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747,
780 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (holding plaintiff diagnosed with depression deemed not disabled
under ADA); Scherer v. GE Capital Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1134, 1136 (D. Kan. 1999)
(holding plaintiff diagnosed with severe anxiety deemed not disabled under ADA).
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judgment.69 Thus, the 1990 ADA was widely considered to be a failure in
protecting individuals with disabilities in the workplace.70
2. 2008 Amendments
Dissatisfied with the courts’ narrow interpretation of disability,71 Congress
passed the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008.72 The ADAAA
expanded the scope of disability, including the scope of “mental” disability.73
Congress emphasized that a court’s “determination of disability ‘should
not demand extensive analysis,’ and ‘shall be construed in favor of broad
coverage . . . to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the] Act.’”74
This change made it much easier for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment.75
The ADAAA overturned several Supreme Court precedents: First, the
amendments explicitly direct courts to consider whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity “without regard to the ameliorative
effects of mitigating measures.”76 This overturned the Court’s ruling in
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., which had held that whether a person had
a disability had to be assessed with regard to any ameliorative measures
that an individual used.77
Second, the amendments expanded the definition of disability in three
ways. This expansion effectively overturned the Court’s ruling in Toyota
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, which had limited disabilities to only
impairments that were so severe that they prevented individuals from doing
activities that were “of central importance to most people’s daily lives.”78
69. Hensel, supra note 7, at 81 (citing Colker, supra note 36, at 99–100).
70. For a list of scholarly explanations describing the originally enacted ADA’s failure
to protect persons with disabilities and the subsequent judicial backlash, see Olsen, supra
note 7, at 1493–96.
71. See Porter, supra note 48, at 222.
72. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
73. Porter, supra note 48, at 223.
74. Hensel, supra note 7, at 83 (footnotes omitted) (quoting ADA Amendments Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2(b)(5), 4(a)(4)(A), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–55 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)); see also Olsen, supra note 7, at 1491 (“Some legal
scholars have described these amendments as ‘instructional,’ in the sense that the ADAAA
directs courts to ‘interpret the same statutory language in a different way.’” (quoting Kate
Webber, Correcting the Supreme Court—Will It Listen? Using the Models of Judicial DecisionMaking To Predict the Future of the ADA Amendments Act, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 305,
325 (2014))).
75. See Porter, supra note 48, at 217; Porter, supra note 51, at 536–37; Nicole
Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 19–46 (2014).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i); see also Porter, supra note 48, at 223–24.
77. 527 U.S. 471, 475, 482 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Acts
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3554.
78. Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002), superseded by statute,
ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3554.
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Congress abandoned the Court’s narrow reading of disabilities covered
under the ADA, opting instead for a broad interpretation of disability that
affected a nonexhaustive list of “major life activities.”79 Major life activities
include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, learning, concentrating,
thinking, communicating, and working.80
Additionally, an impairment may still be considered a disability when
it is in remission.81 As a result, “episodic” impairments are protected under
the ADA.82 Temporary impairments also qualify for protection under the
ADA, so long as the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.83
For example, in Summers v. Altarum Institute, Corp., the Fourth Circuit
noted that the ADAAA did not impose a durational requirement for “actual”
disabilities.84

79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b), 12102(2); see also Porter, supra note 48, at 223.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Prior to the 2008 amendment, “some courts had
previously refused to recognize” the activities on this list as major life activities. Hensel,
supra note 7, at 83; see, e.g., Humbles v. Principi, 141 F. App’x 709, 712 (10th Cir. 2005)
(“[I]nteractions with others and concentration have not been deemed major life activities
by this circuit.”); Boerst v. Gen. Mills Operations, Inc., 25 F. App’x 403, 406 (6th Cir.
2002) (holding “concentrating” not major life activity); Curtis D. Edmonds, Snakes and
Ladders: Expanding the Definition of “Major Life Activity” in the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 321, 325 (2002).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a
disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”).
82. See, e.g., Howard v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, No. 11-1938, 2013 WL 102662,
at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2013) (holding fibromyalgia, though episodic and only appearing
in wet or rainy weather, protected under ADA). Fibromyalgia is believed to be both a mental
and physical impairment. See Fibromyalgia: Symptoms & Causes, MAYO CLINIC, https://
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/fibromyalgia/symptoms-causes/syc-20354780
[https://perma.cc/4R96-37QS] (“Researchers believe that fibromyalgia amplifies painful
sensations by affecting the way your brain processes pain signals.”).
83. See, e.g., Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 333 (4th Cir. 2014).
84. Id. at 332. The ADAAA only “imposes a six-month requirement with respect
to ‘regarded-as’ disabilities.” Id.
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Finally, the ADAAA broadened the regarded as prong.85 Subsequently,
courts have heeded Congress’s mandate to broaden the definition of disability;
as a result, far more plaintiffs are surviving summary judgment.86
While Congress has expanded who the ADA protects, it has not significantly
expanded protections for individuals with disabilities, particularly individuals
with mental disabilities. This larger group of protected persons cannot
maximize ADA benefits because employers are afraid to initiate an interactive
process to provide an employee with reasonable accommodations because
doing so can expose them to liability for regarding that individual as
disabled.87
B. The Employer’s Role Under the ADA
The employer’s role is focused on preventative law and guided by
statutory restrictions, whereas the employee’s course of legal action is
centered around reactive law,88 with two potential causes of action that
directly contradict one another.89 This Section examines the employer’s
statutorily constrained role and explains why employees are currently unable
to enjoy the ADA’s broad protections until after the employee files a
lawsuit.
To begin, employers cannot inquire about an employee’s disability.90
Nor can they require any medical examinations before extending an
employment offer.91 Additionally, they cannot request employee medical

85. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (“An individual meets the requirement of ‘being
regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has
been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit
a major life activity.”). Under the ADAAA, “an ADA plaintiff no longer faces the difficult
task of proving that a defendant’s misperception of his or her condition was so severe as
to amount to a belief that the condition substantially limited a major life activity. Instead,
the new amendments place the focus on the employer’s motivation.” Alex B. Long, Introducing
the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 224 (2008).
86. See Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the
ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2031–32 (2013). For a discussion
of how the broader reading of disability applied to Title II of the ADA, as well, see Ryan
Ballard & Chris Henry, Mediation and Mental Health Claims Under the ADA, 44 CAP. U.
L. REV. 31, 52–54 (2016).
87. See infra Part III.
88. For a comparison of proactive and reactive law, see infra Section III.C.3.
89. See infra Section II.C.
90. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 86 (“Individuals with disabilities may not be forced
to disclose their [disability] status in any respect.”).
91. Id. at 86 (“These broad prohibitions extend to every step of the hiring process,
including written job applications, employment interviews, and—increasingly significant
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records to show a substantially limiting disability,92 nor may employers
rely solely upon a physician’s opinion as to whether an employee has a mental
disability and is in need of reasonable accommodations.93 Furthermore,
an employee’s failure to make direct requests for specific accommodations
does not relieve an employer of the duty to provide reasonable
accommodations.94 These prohibitions against disclosure act as barriers
to ADA-protected employees because employers are less likely to initiate
the interactive process when they can be held liable for regarded as
discrimination.95
In order for ADA-protected employees to enjoy the full benefits of the
ADA and receive reasonable accommodations, an employer should have
notice of the employee’s disability so that it can enter into the interactive
process without worrying about regarded as liability.96 As described below,
coaxing employee disclosure through new legislation will give employers
an opportunity to engage in the interactive process without worrying about
regarded as liability.97

in the digital age—any background investigation conducted by the employer directly or
indirectly.”).
92. Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that the ADA’s statutory language,
the EEOC’s implementing regulations, and case law do not require employees to supply
the employer with any medical testimony to prove an employee’s substantial limitations.
Frank C. Morris, Jr., Selected Developments Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, SY002
ALI-CLE 751 (2016) (citing EEOC v. AutoZone Inc., 630 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2010); Head
v. Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005)).
93. See, e.g., Lafata v. Dearborn Heights Sch. Dist. No. 7, No. 13-cv-10755, 2013
WL 6500068, at *9–10 (S.D. Mich. Dec. 11, 2013) (“[Doctor’s] deposition testimony
reflects that his examination of Plaintiff was neither lengthy nor comprehensive. The School
District has a duty to review [the doctor’s] report to assure itself that his examination and
analysis were thorough and/or reasonable.”).
94. See, e.g., Heath v. Brennan, No. 2:13-cv-00386-JDL, 2015 WL 2340781, at *7–
8, *10 (D. Me. May 14, 2015) (holding employee’s history of disabilities and prior EEOC
complaints and settlement agreements still gave employer reason to know it should engage
in interactive process to ascertain reasonable accommodations for employee—even though
prior settlement agreements had not been breached).
95. See infra Section II.C.2.
96. See infra Section II.C.2.
97. See infra Section IV.B.
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C. The Plaintiff’s Two Current Causes of Action that
Create the Catch-22
The employer’s dilemma here is couched between two causes of action:
(1) failure to accommodate98 and (2) regarded as discrimination.99
1. Failure to Accommodate
Under the ADA, plaintiffs may file a suit for a failure to accommodate
using two distinct methods.100 First, plaintiffs may show that (1) they are
a qualified individual with a disability that substantially limits a major life
activity; (2) the employer knew or had reason to know the employee needed
a reasonable accommodation; and (3) the employer failed to offer a reasonable
accommodation to the employee.101 Once the employee establishes these
elements, the burden shifts to the employer to show that an accommodation
would place an “undue hardship” on the employer.102
Second, and more pertinently here, plaintiffs may show that (1) the employer
knew or had reason to know that the qualified individual had a disability,
(2) the employer knew or had reason to know that the employee needed a
reasonable accommodation, and (3) the employer failed to initiate the interactive
process.103 In other words, liability for failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation does not require discriminatory animus; it only requires
proof that the employer did not sufficiently engage in the interactive process

98. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012).
99. Id. § 12102(1)(C).
100. Id. § 12112(b)(5); see also U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 407 (2002)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court of Appeals also correctly held that there was a triable issue
of fact precluding the entry of summary judgment with respect to whether petitioner violated
the statute by failing to engage in an interactive process concerning respondent’s three proposed
accommodations.”).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). Reasonable accommodations may include “job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices . . . and other similar accommodations
for individuals with disabilities.” Id. § 12111(9)(B).
102. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). This Comment does not examine undue hardship in detail
because this burden shift happens at trial, and this Comment is focused on keeping employers
compliant without a trial. For another look at burden shifting in the employment law context,
see generally Joss Teal, Comment, A Survivor’s Tale: McDonnell Douglas in a Post-Nassar
World, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 937 (2018).
103. See, e.g., Barnett, 535 U.S. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Gray v.
U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:09-cv-327-APR, 2013 WL 6682951, at *20 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 17, 2013)
(“In failure to accommodate cases, in addition to showing that he is a qualified disabled
individual, the plaintiff must show that the employer was aware of his disability and failed
to accommodate it.”).
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to provide the employee with a reasonable accommodation.104 Thus, having
reason to know under the second prong triggers an employer’s duty to initiate
an interactive process. This reason to know standard directly conflicts with
the second cause of action described below.
2. Regarded As Discrimination
Plaintiffs may also file regarded as claims under the ADAAA.105 There
are two ways that a plaintiff may show regarded as discrimination here:
(1) an employer mistakenly believes that an employee has a mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) an employer
mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits
one or more major life activities.106 In either case, the employer must have
“entertain[ed] misperceptions about the individual.”107
This second option creates tension with the reason to know standard discussed
above because employers face liability for failing to trigger the interactive
process without explicitly knowing of an employee’s disability. Yet, an
employer may also face liability for assuming that an employee is disabled.
Additionally, just to cover their bases, plaintiffs are increasingly filing
104. See THOMSON REUTERS, EXECUTIVE LEGAL SUMMARY NO. 349, REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE ADA (2019) (“An employer can breach
this duty to accommodate without being motivated by any discriminatory animus.”).
105. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012).
Congress added the regarded as prong to hamper discrimination based on “archaic attitudes”
and “erroneous but nevertheless prevalent perceptions about the handicapped.” Sch. Bd.
of Nassau Cty v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), (C) (2012); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3554.
107. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. That is, the worker need only show that the employer believed
that the worker had a mental or physical impairment, not that such impairment affected
him or her to any specific degree; under the “regarded as” prong, the employer’s perception
about the worker is the court’s pivotal inquiry. Sowell v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 139 F. Supp.
3d 684, 700 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Douglas A. Haas, Could the American Psychiatric Association
Cause You Headaches? The Dangerous Interaction Between the DSM-5 and Employment
Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 683, 699 (2013) (“While an employer is not required to provide
reasonable accommodations to individuals who are only ‘regarded as’ disabled under the
ADA, the post-ADAAA regulations add that ‘regarded as’ disability discrimination may
arise from adverse employment actions taken based on the symptoms of actual or perceived
impairments, or on medication used to treat such impairments.” (footnotes omitted) (citing
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1) (2019))). Both of these causes of action under the ADA are part
of what is known as “reactive” law because they can only guarantee rights through litigation,
i.e. after an employer has already infringed upon a right. See infra Section III.C.3.
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both causes of action against the employer.108 Congress can alleviate this
tension by making some minor adjustments to the ADA.109
III. THE CURRENT ADA’S AMBIGUOUS TRIGGER ENSNARES
EMPLOYERS IN INEVITABLE LEGAL LIABILITY
The problem sketched above110 is dire. The current ADA provisions lead
to absurd results—this cannot be what Congress intended when enacting the
ADA.111 If an employer cannot inquire about an employee’s limitations,
require a medical exam, or ask for medical records, an employer is left
with nothing but its impressions that an employee may have a disability.
But relying on such “impressions” resembles nothing more than relying
on stereotypes about disabilities—that is, resembles nothing more than
“regarding” a worker as disabled.
This framework is disadvantageous to both the employer and the employee:
employers face liability, and employees are not offered a reasonable
accommodation.112 Thus, Congress should require employee disclosure
of a disability as an element in failure to accommodate claims to encourage
disclosure and get employees what they actually need—reasonable
accommodations—not legal fees.113
Additionally, Congress should bar some forms of alternative pleading
in ADA suits. Congress implemented the regarded as prong of the ADAAA
to debunk the “myths, fears[,] and stereotypes associated with disabilities,”114

108. Employees continue to file both failures to accommodate and regarded as claims
in the same suit. See, e.g., Southall v. USF Holland, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-1266, 2018 WL 6413651,
*7–8 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2018) (alleging both that (1) plaintiff qualified as disabled under
ADA for failure to accommodate, and (2) defendant-employer discriminated against
plaintiff-employee by regarding plaintiff as disabled).
109. See infra Part IV.
110. See supra Section II.C.
111. Congress did not intend to terrify employers with legal liability to the point that
they fear offering employees reasonable accommodations; instead, Congress sought to integrate
persons with disabilities into the workplace with employers’ help—with reasonable
accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012). Although thus far Congress has
relied on the courts to interpret ambiguities, the judicial interpretation approach has led to
circuit splits. See infra notes 76–89 and accompanying text. The increasing numbers of
ADA plaintiffs demonstrate that Congress should settle these circuit splits and clarify the
interactive process’s trigger so that qualified individuals get reasonable accommodations—not
court fees. See infra Sections III.A, III.B.
112. For a discussion of unachieved ADA policy goals, see infra Section III.B.
113. See infra Section IV.B.1.
114. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999), (quoting 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(l) (2019)), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3554.
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and to broaden the coverage of the ADA.115 However, allowing for alternative
pleading when employees are pursuing a failure to accommodate claim does
not help discredit such notions; alternative pleading only gives plaintiffs
another option for recovery.116 By statutorily restricting this alternative pleading
approach, Congress can help make sure that employees are getting the help
they need without filing a lawsuit.117
This Part explores three key reasons why Congress should amend the
ADA. First, current trends show that employers are increasingly more likely
to face liability under the ADA.118 With the upsurge in mental disability
diagnoses, employers are increasingly more likely to encounter a candidate
with a mental disability or an employee whose disability is not easily apparent
and who may not request a reasonable accommodation.119 Unfortunately,
circuits do not uniformly interpret employer liability under the ADA,120
which means employers still remain without much guidance—even with
judicial interpretations of the ADA.
Second, today’s predicament establishes that the ADA’s policy goals
remain unachieved.121 If employers are unable to take the necessary steps
to help employees with mental disabilities, then disabled employees are not
able to enjoy the same employment opportunities as their nondisabled
coworkers.122 This lack of workplace opportunity means that the ADA is
still not adequately protecting disabled employees.123
Finally, this Part explores proactive methods of guaranteeing these statutory
rights to ADA-protected individuals.124 Other solutions proposed, such as

115. See Haas, supra note 107, at 697–98 (“Finally, the ADAAA rejected federal courts’
requirement that plaintiffs alleging ‘regarded as’ disability prove that defendants perceived
their real or imagined disabilities to be ‘substantially limiting.’ Instead, to satisfy this
prong, the Act only required plaintiffs to prove that they suffered disability discrimination
‘because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.’ The ADAAA also
provided that employers need not extend a reasonable accommodation to individuals who
merely satisfy the ‘regarded as’ definition of disability.” (footnotes omitted)).
116. For a discussion of reactive and proactive law, see infra Section III.C.3.
117. See infra Section III.C.3.
118. See infra Sections III.A.1, III.A.3.
119. See infra Sections III.A.1, III.A.3.
120. See infra Section III.A.2.
121. See infra Section III.B.
122. See infra Section III.B.
123. See infra Section III.B.
124. See infra Section III.C.
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factors tests and mediation, are simply reactive solutions to this problem.125
Additionally, although the EEOC plays an instrumental role in enforcing
the ADA, this role is also a reactive response.126 Employers need a proactive
approach and better congressional guidance to help ensure that their disabled
employees have the best support possible.127
For these reasons, Congress should delineate a clearer approach to the
interactive process by requiring employee disclosure as an element in failure
to accommodate claims.128 This disclosure would thus explicitly trigger the
interactive process.129 Additionally, Congress should prohibit dual pleading of
regarded as and failure to accommodate claims.130
A. Contemporary Trends Show that Employers Increasingly
Face Legal Liability Under the ADA
Some scholars argue that the 2008 amendment eliminated any catch-22
in the ADA.131 However, the catch-22 has merely shifted, instead entrapping
employers rather than plaintiffs.132 As a result of the 2008 amendments to
the ADA, far more plaintiffs’ ADA cases are surviving summary judgment.133
Although recent legal amendments have encouraged employers to hire
disabled employees,134 these amendments “unquestionably” make the
reasonable accommodation request process more challenging because
employees with mental disabilities often have “unique needs.”135 Without
encouraging employee disclosure by requiring it as an element of a failure
to accommodate claim,136 employers will continue to miss opportunities
125. See infra Section III.C.1.
126. See infra Section III.C.2.
127. See infra Section III.C.3.
128. See infra Section IV.B.1.
129. See infra Section IV.B.1.
130. See infra Section IV.B.2.
131. See, e.g., Ballard & Henry, supra note 86, at 51.
132. See supra Section II.C.
133. See Befort, supra note 86, at 2050 (finding significantly lower rates of courts
granting summary judgment to employers for disability finding after passage of ADA
Amendments Act).
134. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 75–76. The 2016 amendment to the Rehabilitation
Act “require[s] some federal contractors to attempt to achieve a workforce comprised of
at least 7% of employees with disabilities.” Id.; see also Olsen, supra note 7, at 1488 n.11
(citing Affirmative Action and Nondiscrimination Obligations of Contractors and Subcontractors
Regarding Individuals with Disabilities, 78 Fed. Reg. 58,681, 58,682 (Sept. 24, 2013)
(codified as amended at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-741 (2019)). These recent legal amendments have
helped created equal opportunities for both mentally disabled employees—to gain employment
in the workplace—and employers—“to tap into the talents and abilities of a sizable
population of workers.” Hensel, supra note 7, at 76.
135. Hensel, supra note 7, at 76.
136. See infra Section IV.B.1.
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to reasonably accommodate their ADA-protected employees and best
leverage their diverse workforces.137
This Section examines how employers are increasingly more likely to
hire persons with mental disabilities,138 how courts inconsistently interpret
the ADA’s trigger to the interactive process,139 and how the number of ADA
plaintiffs is only growing.140 Thus, as the ADA currently stands, employers
will undoubtedly find themselves in a dilemma—unable to offer reasonable
accommodations to their mentally disabled employees for fear of regarded
as liability.
1. As Mental Disability Diagnoses Continue to Increase, the
Number of Employees with Mental Disabilities
Will Also Increase in the Workplace
The number of mental diagnoses has increased dramatically since the
first enactment of the ADA in 1990.141 A recent U.S. Census Bureau report
estimates that one in five Americans has a disability.142 Since the 1980s,
mental health diagnoses have more than doubled, and for children, mental
health diagnoses have increased more than 3000%.143 With the medical
community’s growing recognition that mental health is equally as important
as physical health, Americans will continue to see an increase in mental
disability diagnoses.144
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.A.1.
See infra Section III.A.2.
See infra Section III.A.3.
See, e.g., Hensel, supra note 7, at 74.
Nearly 1 in 5 People Have a Disability in the U.S., Census Bureau Reports, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (July 25, 2012), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/
miscellaneous/cb12-134.html [https://perma.cc/FPQ8-K3F4].
143. See Lauren Fierro, Note and Comment, Reasonably Accommodating Employees
with Mental Health Conditions by Putting Them Back to Work, 46 SW. L. REV. 423, 429
(2017). Autism diagnoses, for example, have increased more than 78% since 2007. Hensel,
supra note 7, at 74. Recent studies estimate that one out of every sixty-eight children suffers
from autism. Id. Over the next decade, studies suggest “a 230 percent increase in the
number of [young people] with autism transitioning to adulthood.” Michelle Diament, As
More with Autism Near Adulthood, Clues to Success Emerge, DISABILITY SCOOP (May 14,
2015), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2015/05/14/as-autism-adulthood-clues/20299/ [https://
perma.cc/58LU-26GT].
144. The medical community’s growing recognition is reflected in the 2015 changes
to the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT). See Barry Hong, The Teaching of Psychology
and the New MCAT, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Aug. 2012), https://www.apa.org/ed/precollege/ptn/
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Although many physically disabled plaintiffs’ claims may be dismissed
because the individual is an unqualified individual in a blue-collar company,145
workplace trends show a growing shift toward white-collar employment.146
In other words, more persons with mental disabilities are entering offices,
which may be better equipped to make reasonable accommodations without
undue hardship to the company. However, what was once deemed
inappropriate office behavior, and a terminable offense, may actually be
protected under the ADA.147 Unfortunately, this means that employers are
less likely to take proactive approaches to managing workplace performance
or offer reasonable accommodations because an employer may be held
liable for regarding an employee as mentally disabled.148
2012/08/mcat.aspx [https://perma.cc/LJ9G-9W4X]. The MCAT had not been changed since
1991. Id. However, the MCAT now tests on psychology and behavior:
The importance of the inclusion of psychology and behavioral science on the
MCAT cannot be minimized. Students who aspire to a career in medicine will
be alerted to the fact that psychosocial/cultural issues matter and are as important
as the biological and physical sciences because knowledge of the scientific
aspects of psychology will need to be attained by pre[-]med students. Thus, the
new MCAT may strengthen the level of scientific psychology instruction in many
colleges and universities. Indirectly, the MCAT will help raise the awareness
that psychological science is an embedded, essential aspect of health care.
Id. For a suggestion that adding the new portion on mental health to the MCAT was just
“part of a decade-long effort by medical educators to restore a bit of good old-fashioned
healing and bedside patient skills into a profession that has come to be dominated by
technology and laboratory testing,” see Elisabeth Rosenthal, Pre-Med’s New Priorities:
Heart and Soul and Social Science, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/
2012/04/15/education/edlife/pre-meds-new-priorities-heart-and-soul-and-social-science.html
[https://perma.cc/48AW-Q5KH].
145. Employees may lose protection under the ADA because they must also be qualified
to perform essential job functions. In a blue-collar setting, attendance is often an essential
job function, whereas white-collar settings invite alternative work schedules, such as workfrom-home programs. For an example of losing ADA coverage because regular attendance
was an essential job function at a nursing center, see Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med.
Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 2012).
146. Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, the United States had seen the lowest unemployment
rates in fifty years. U.S. DEP’T LABOR, NEWS RELEASE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE WEEKLY
CLAIMS (2018), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OPA/newsreleases/ui-claims/20181534.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C4H7-5G7C] (lowest unemployment insurance claims filed since 1969);
see also Economic News Release: Job Openings and Labor Turnover Summary, U.S. DEP’T
LAB., https://www.bls.gov/news.release/jolts.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/QG4T-MG3J] (last
updated Feb. 11, 2020) (reporting more job openings than job seekers). However, “globalization
and automation” have reduced blue-collar work. Sean Gregory, The Jobs That Weren’t
Saved, TIME (May 18, 2017), http://time.com/4783921/the-jobs-that-werent-saved/ [https://
perma.cc/52MK-QK3L]; see also Jacob Bogage, Coronavirus Unemployment Guide: What to
Do If You Get Laid Off or Furloughed, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/business/2020/04/03/unemployed-coronavirus-faq/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/
8V86-TUEK] (discussing how the coronavirus has decreased blue-collar jobs).
147. See supra Section III.B.
148. See supra Section II.C.
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Compared to physical disabilities, mental disabilities offer a unique
challenge because no two mental disabilities affect individuals in the same
way, which “makes it difficult to offer categorical statements” regarding
any mental disability.149 For example, some persons with mental disabilities
may actually have above average intelligence, which is advantageous for
employers,150 but have “obsessive behaviors” and “delays in communication
and language usage.”151 Thus, these varied symptoms and skillsets are
challenging for employers to navigate and determine whether the employer’s
duty to engage in the interactive process has been triggered, especially for
employers with limited resources.152
The threat of regarded as discrimination thwarts reasonable accommodations
and thus undermines workplace productivity, spurs employee turnover,
and diminishes bottom lines. A recent study, for example, found that 31%
of surveyed executives believed mental health issues “were the leading
cause of lost productivity and increased absenteeism at work.”153 Other
research shows that employees diagnosed with major depressive disorders
miss, on average, about twenty-seven days of work annually, and employees
diagnosed with bipolar disorder miss about sixty-five days.154 These absences

149. Hensel, supra note 7, at 76.
150. See id. (“[T]here is little doubt that increasing numbers of individuals with
[autism] will enter the labor pool over the next decade. This shift presents tremendous
opportunities both for people with autism to integrate into the workforce and for employers
to tap into the talents and abilities of a sizable population of workers.”). For an example
of successful companies leveraging diversity in the workplace, see Mary F. Salomon &
Joan M. Schork, Turn Diversity to Your Advantage, 46 RES. TECH. MGMT., July–Aug.
2003, at 37, 37.
151. Hensel, supra note 7, at 77 (citing Rebecca A. Johnson, “Pure” Science and “Impure”
Influences: The DSM at a Scientific and Social Crossroads, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 147, 194 (2013)).
152. See John J. Quinn, Personal Ethics and Business Ethics: The Ethical Attitudes
of Owner/Managers of Small Business, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS 119, 126 (1997).
153. Ballard & Henry, supra note 86, at 31; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., MENTAL
HEALTH AND WORK: IMPACT, ISSUES, AND GOOD PRACTICES 1 (2000), https://www.who.int/mental
_health/media/en/712.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRT8-SCJE] (“The impact of mental health
problems in the workplace has serious consequences not only for the individual but also for the
productivity of the enterprise. Employee performance, rates of illness, absenteeism, accidents
and staff turnover are all affected by employees’ mental health status.”).
154. Ballard & Henry, supra note 86, at 31 (citing Ronald C. Kessler et al., Prevalence
and Effects of Mood Disorders on Work Performance in a Nationally Representative
Sample of U.S. Workers, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1561, 1564 (2006)).
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may cost employers up to $100 billion annually in lost productivity
alone.155
Without improving the odds of engaging in the interactive process by
requiring employee disclosure in failure to accommodate claims,156 employers
will be less able to discover reasonable accommodations for their employees
with mental disabilities.157 Additionally, removing regarded as liability
as an alternative cause of action158 will encourage employers to continue
engaging in the interactive process until the appropriate reasonable
accommodations are discovered—and perhaps throughout the employee’s
career.
2. The Current Legal Landscape Demonstrates that Even Courts Are
Unsure Whether Employers Have the Best Tools to
Support Persons with Mental Disabilities
Currently, employers do not have much legal guidance on the interactive
process.159 Congress has yet to clarify standards on the interactive process
with any statutes. Examining case law, only one Supreme Court case has
even mentioned the interactive process.160 This lack of legal guidance has
led circuits to inconsistently interpret what triggers the interactive process.161
As a result, a number of courts have incorrectly applied ADA case law to
current disability claims.162 Thus, nonlegally trained employers are left to
construe an ambiguous law, and often face liability as a result.163
The Supreme Court has only once commented on the interactive process.164
In United States Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit’s approach to determining whether an employer had violated
the ADA by analyzing whether the employer had failed to engage in the
interactive process.165 Thus, although Barnett was heard in the early 2000s,

155. Fierro, supra note 143, at 429–30 (quoting Mental Health Conditions, NAT’L
ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/Learn-More/Mental-Health-Conditions
[https://perma.cc/3WDK-6XJA]).
156. See infra Section IV.B.1.
157. See infra Section III.B.
158. See infra Section IV.B.2.
159. See Olsen, supra note 7, at 1496.
160. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 407 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring).
161. See Olsen, supra note 7, at 1496.
162. See id.; see also Annie Decker, A Theory of Local Common Law, 35 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1939, 1963 (2014) (“It is well known that the U.S. Supreme Court waits before
resolving federal circuit splits to let federal circuit courts of appeal take the first crack at
the legal and policy questions.”).
163. See supra Section II.C.
164. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 406–07 (majority opinion).
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as the only case to broach the subject of the interactive process, a number
of courts continue to rely on the Ninth Circuit’s approach.166
Most notably, the Ninth Circuit included a “reason to know” standard
before the 2008 amendments, when it stated: “In circumstances in which
an employee is unable to make such a request, if the company knows of
the existence of the employee’s disability, the employer must assist in
initiating the interactive process.”167 In construing the ADA, the Ninth
Circuit considered both a Senate report and the EEOC’s guidelines to
examine the steps of the interactive process.168 In sum, the Ninth Circuit
held that employers who failed to engage in the interactive process should
be held liable for a failure to accommodate, and that the question of
whether the employer engaged in a good faith interaction may often be a
factual question for the jury.169 This employer liability for failure to trigger
the interactive process is a critical device contributing to the employer’s
dilemma.
After Barnett, the interactive process trigger remains unclear. If anything,
the Barnett Court merely “created uncertainty” for employers “by rejecting a
categorical approach” that delineated specific employment policies that
would suffice under the ADA.170 Furthermore, because the Barnett decision
“created a more plaintiff-friendly approach . . . for addressing other types of
employment policies,” an employer is far less likely to approach employees
who have not explicitly asked for an accommodation.171 This fear of liability
hinders employers from engaging in the interactive process, and ADA-protected
employees are thus not enjoying the full benefits of equal employment
opportunities under the ADA.172
166. See, e.g., Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 839 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Because
there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kowitz made a request for
an accommodation sufficient to trigger Trinity’s duty to engage in the interactive process
of identifying a reasonable accommodation, the judgment of the district court is reversed
and remanded for further proceedings.”).
167. Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated,
535 U.S. 391 (2002). In contrast, for a typical ADA decision tree, which lacked any reason
to know standard for employers before the 2008 amendment, see Gerald V. O’Brien & Christina
Ellegood, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Decision Tree for Social Services Administrators,
50 SOC. WORK 271, 273 tbl.1 (2005).
168. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1114.
169. Id. at 1116.
170. Michelle Letourneau, Providing Plaintiffs with Tools: The Significance of EEOC v.
United Airlines, Inc., 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1373, 1403 (2015).
171. Id.
172. See infra Section III.B.
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Perhaps what is most admirable—and most concerning—about the Ninth
Circuit’s Barnett analysis is the court’s policy exploration.173 Initially, the
court got it right when it stated that “[w]ithout the interactive process, many
employers will be unable to identify effective reasonable accommodations.”174
The court reasoned that without the threat of liability under failure to
accommodate claims for not engaging in the interactive process, “employers
would have less incentive to engage in a cooperative dialogue and to explore
fully the existence and feasibility of reasonable accommodations.”175
The Ninth Circuit’s policy reasoning, however, may now be outdated.
Although this promulgation was perhaps quite accurate back in the early
2000s, the analysis does not hold up today because it neglects the 2008
amendments’ expanded scope of regarded as employer liability.176 Today,
employers are disincentivized from engaging in the interactive process when
they may face liability for regarding an employee as mentally disabled.177
Thus, due to congressional silence and sparse, outdated Supreme Court
precedent, circuits are split on a variety of issues regarding the interactive
process and reasonable accommodations.178 For example, circuits are split
on which circumstances the offering of a reassignment is a reasonable
accommodation.179 The Seventh Circuit held that automatic reassignment
may not be possible when the employer already has a most-qualified policy
in place.180 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit recently held that failure to reassign
a disabled employee to a vacant position violates the ADA.181
Circuits are also split on whether an employer must rescind a discharge
if it later learns that an employee’s terminable behavior was due to a
mental disability.182 Although the EEOC regulations state that employers
do not need to rescind a discharge for an individual who violated a company

173. See Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1116.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See supra Section II.C.2.
177. See supra Section II.C.2.
178. For example, circuits are split on which circumstances the offering of a reassignment
is a reasonable accommodation. Compare EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc. (United Airlines
II), 693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Assuming that the district court finds that mandatory
reassignment is ordinarily reasonable, the district must then determine (under Barnett step
two) if there are fact-specific considerations particular to United’s employment system that
would create an undue hardship and render mandatory reassignment unreasonable.”), with
EEOC v. TriCore Reference Labs., 849 F.3d 929, 938 n.8 (10th Cir. 2017) (“The EEOC’s
view that TriCore admitted to a violation arises from both the text of the ADA and our case
law.”).
179. See Letourneau, supra note 170, at 1373.
180. See id. at 1374.
181. See TriCore Reference Labs., 849 F.3d at 938 n.8.
182. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 83; see also Fierro, supra note 143, at 432–33.
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policy as a result of a mental disability that needed an accommodation,183
the EEOC’s regulations are not law.184 Nonetheless, without a discernible
framework delineated from Congress or the Supreme Court, most courts
rely on the EEOC’s guidelines.185
Finally, circuits are split as to whether an employer is put on constructive
notice of an employee’s disability and need of a reasonable accommodation
when the employee has not expressly communicated such a disability or
accommodation request.186 The Eighth Circuit, for example, “has not
consistently held a uniform rule regarding what information an employer
must have before it is obligated to engage in the interactive process.”187
In contrast, as discussed above, the Ninth Circuit has implemented a reason
to know standard for nearly two decades. 188 This uncertainty around
constructive notice is troubling because it does not afford employers
an opportunity to engage in the interactive process and find reasonable
accommodations for employees189 for fear of being held liable for regarded
as discrimination.190
This ambiguity also spills into other areas of dispute resolution.191 For
example, a recent study on ADA arbitration showed that 64% of arbitrators
cited legal authority other than the ADA statute.192 Some arbitrators cited

183. EEOC, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES question 31, ex. C (1997), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/psych.html [https://perma.cc/6LW7-D3YQ].
184. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 83. Courts occasionally give EEOC regulations Chevron
deference, however, the regulations are not law. See id. at 83 n.77. For a brief explanation
of the varying levels of judicial deference granted to the EEOC, see infra Section III.C.2.
185. See Fierro, supra note 143, at 432. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has held that
an employee is not afforded a “second chance to control a controllable disability.” Id.
186. See Rachel S. Kim, Note, Help Me, Help You: Eighth Circuit Diminishes a Notice
Requirement for Employees Seeking an ADA Accommodation: Kowitz v. Trinity Health,
839 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2016), 83 MO. L. REV. 409, 409–10, 417–18 (2018).
187. Id. at 5409–10 (citing Craig A. Sullivan, The ADA’s Interactive Process, 57 J.
MO. B. 116, 118–119 (2001)).
188. See Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated,
535 U.S. 391 (2002).
189. See infra Section III.B.
190. See supra Section II.C.2.
191. See Stacy A. Hickox & Angela T. Hall, Arbitration of Claims for Accommodations:
A Fair Resolution?, 52 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 66 (2018).
192. Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of
Employment-Discrimination Claims, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 789, 830 (2013).
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case law, while others cited EEOC guidelines or treatises.193 Some arbitrated
decisions did not cite any legal authority whatsoever.194
Without a clear trigger for the interactive process, employees are not
fully benefiting from the reasonable accommodations guaranteed to them
by the ADA.195 Employers reasonably fear regarded as liability.196 As
discussed below, there are some simple ways that Congress can help both
employees and employers with new legislation.197
3. Current Statistics Show More Plaintiffs Are Filing ADA Claims
In 2017, more than 35% of EEOC claims filed in California were based
on disability.198 In other words, disability claims have surpassed the amount
of “claims filed based on any other protected characteristic, including
race, sex, color, religion, national origin, or age.”199 Another recent study
demonstrates that 59% of arbitrated claims decided in plaintiffs’ favor
developed because the employer had failed to interact properly.200 Moreover,
plaintiffs continue to file regarded as ADA claims after employers believe
the interactive process has been triggered and begin discussing reasonable
accommodations with the employee.201

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See infra Section III.B.
196. See supra Section II.C.2.
197. See infra Section IV.B.
198. See Kevin Rivera, Accommodating Attorneys, 41 L.A. LAW., Mar. 2018 at 20, 20.
199. Id.; see EEOC Charge Receipts by State (Includes U.S. Territories) and Basis
for 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/state_17.cfm [https://perma.cc/P4V7-NBZ4]. In California, the Department
of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) also reported similar findings. Rivera, supra
note 198 (“[The DFEH] reported that the majority of employment-based discrimination
claims it received in 2016 were based on disability.” (citing CAL. DEP’T FAIR EMP’T & HOUS.,
2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2017))). The EEOC may “utilize regional, State, local, and other
agencies” to enforce equal employment laws. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(1) (2012). In California,
the EEOC and DFEH have a work-sharing agreement. See State and Local Agencies, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/field/losangeles/fepa.cfm
[https://perma.cc/XF9F-HBLX].
The EEOC works with the Fair Employment Practice Agencies (FEPAs) and
Tribal Employment Rights Offices (TEROs) to manage charges of discrimination
and the protection of the employment rights of Native Americans. The EEOC
contracts with approximately 90 FEPAs nationwide to process more than 48,000
discrimination charges annually. These charges raise claims under state and local
laws prohibiting employment discrimination as well as the federal laws enforced
by the EEOC.
Id.
200. Hickox & Hall, supra note 191, at 37.
201. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., No. 15 C 11540, 2019 WL 172760, at *1,
*2–6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2019). An employee filed suit for regarded as discrimination under
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This upsurge in ADA claims shows how valuable amending the ADA
would be to employees, employers, enforcement agencies, and judicial
economy.202 By clarifying what triggers the interactive process, employees
will have a better opportunity to be awarded a reasonable accommodation
in the workplace.203 Additionally, employers will be explicitly notified
that the employee is requesting a reasonable accommodation and will be
uninhibited in discovering that accommodation without the in terrorem of
regarded as liability.204 This approach will assure that employees receive
reasonable accommodations without filing a lawsuit,205 which will promote
judicial economy.206 Finally, enforcement agencies, such as the EEOC,
will be better able to enforce egregious ADA violations instead of simple
misunderstandings.207
B. Policy Goals Remain Unattainable Under the Current ADA
Congress enacted Title I of the ADA to protect disabled individuals in
the workplace.208 With its 2008 amendment, the ADA should be offering
“unprecedented opportunities . . . [for] work in competitive integrated
employment,”209 and a “new framework for equality.”210 The ADA aims
the ADA when employer requested employee to fill out disability leave request when plaintiff’s
psychiatrist rendered plaintiff “‘totally disabled’ and unable to work at the time” due to “major
depression” and anxiety. Id. at *2.
202. See infra Section IV.B.
203. See infra Section III.B.
204. See supra Section II.C.2.
205. See infra Section III.C.3.
206. See infra Section IV.B.
207. See infra Section III.C.2.
208. Americans with Disabilities Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(1), (4), 122
Stat. 3553, 3553 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)) (“[I]n enacting
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Congress intended that the Act ‘provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities’ and [to] provide broad coverage . . . . The holdings of the
Supreme Court . . . have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded
by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended
to protect.”); see also Jennifer Mathis, The Importance of Framing Federal Mental Health
Policy Within a Disability Rights Framework, 42 HUM. RTS. 14, 14 (2017) (“[T]he Americans
with Disabilities Act . . . expand[s] opportunities for people with disabilities to participate
as full members of society.”).
209. Mathis, supra note 208, at 14.
210. Jamelia N. Morgan, One Not Like the Other: An Examination of the Use of the
Affirmative Action Analogy in Reasonable Accommodation Cases Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 46 CAP. U. L. REV. 191, 192 (2018).
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to protect employees and applicants from “invidious discrimination.”211
Under the ADA, employees have two powerful causes of action: one for
traditional forms of discrimination and another for an employer’s failure
to make reasonable accommodations.212 Additionally, some commentators
suggest that the regarded as prong helps ensure statutory protection for
disabled as well as nondisabled individuals in the workplace.213
However, these statutory protections only offer forms of legal recourse.214
This means that disabled individuals might only enjoy the protections of
the ADA when they file a lawsuit against an employer.215 This approach
is backward-looking and not forward-looking because it focuses on whether
an employer has already violated the ADA.216 Instead, the ADA should focus
on ensuring statutory protection without needing to enter a courtroom.217
Without this pivotal change, ADA-protected employees may continue to
face discrimination or suffer from a lack of reasonable accommodations
and only find redemption after an employer’s violation.218 This statutory
flaw is easily identified by the increase in ADA claims filed.219
Furthermore, the high rates of unemployment for mentally disabled
individuals show that mentally disabled individuals are still not enjoying

211. Elizabeth E. Aronson, Perceived-As Plaintiffs: Expanding Title VII Coverage to
Discrimination Based on Erroneous Perception, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 235, 253 (2016).
The ADA also protects against disparate treatment. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,
540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003). However, this Comment is focused on balancing the need for
reasonable accommodations with allegations of disparate treatment—not disparate impact.
See supra Section II.C. For an explanation of the interplay between disparate impact and
reasonable accommodations, see generally Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation
as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 901–12 (2004).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012). The employer’s affirmative obligation to offer
reasonable accommodations is comparable to affirmative action, in that employers must
take steps to ensure workplace diversity. Morgan, supra note 210, at 192–93.
213. Aronson, supra note 211, at 255; Samuel Brown Petsonk & Anne Marie Lofaso,
Working for Recovery: How the Americans with Disabilities Act and State Human Rights
Laws Can Facilitate Successful Rehabilitation for Alcoholics and Drug Addicts, 120 W.
VA. L. REV. 891, 903–04 (2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012)).
214. See Mary Crossley, Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48
VILL. L. REV. 195, 302 (2003) (“[A] civil rights enforcement approach . . . focuses—perhaps
counterproductively—on backwards-looking ‘blaming and sanctioning’ rather than on moving
forward to design systems that maximize the likelihood that [discrimination ceases].” (footnotes
omitted)); Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 931, 1012 (2003).
215. See infra Section III.C.3.
216. See infra Section III.C.3.
217. See infra Section III.C.3.
218. See infra Section III.C.3. For a comparison of mental health law and disability
law, see Mathis, supra note 208, at 14–16.
219. See supra Section III.A.3.
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the full and equal opportunities of the workplace.220 As of 2017, more than
60% of work-aged individuals with mental disabilities were unemployed.221
These statistics hurt employees, employers, and the government’s budget.
These unemployment rates hurt persons with mental disabilities who are
seeking employment.222 They also undermine employers because turnover
and understaffing result in a “loss of productivity, earnings, and human
potential.”223 Finally, these unemployment rates cost the country $25 billion
in disability payments annually.224
C. Previously Recommended Solutions Still Fall Short
Scholars and practitioners have proposed a number of solutions to help
protect mentally disabled employees under the ADA.225 However, these
solutions neglect the employer’s role in the interactive process and cultivation
of workplace dynamics.226 Additionally, some suggestions include placing
more responsibility on the EEOC.227 However, the EEOC is an enforcement
agency—not a legislative authority.228 Finally, the current proposed solutions
focus on legal recourse instead of ensuring ADA protections at the outset.229

220. See Fierro, supra note 143, at 430.
221. Id.
222. Unemployment can be debilitating for both disabled and nondisabled individuals
because “[w]ork in American society is a source of meaning and respect, and exclusion
from work and productive activity undermines self-worth and reinforces devaluation and
social stigma.” David Mechanic, Cultural and Organizational Aspects of Application of the
Americans with Disabilities Act to Persons with Psychiatric Disabilities, 76 MILBANK Q.
5, 6 (1998).
223. Fierro, supra note 143, at 430 (citing NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, THE HIGH
COSTS OF CUTTING MENTAL HEALTH (2010), http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/1267826/
18732875/1339608141220/Unemployment.pdf? [https://perma.cc/822J-9263]).
224. Id.
225. See infra Section III.C.1.
226. See Sonya Smallets, Understanding Leaves: The Interaction Between Medical
Leave Under FMLA/CFRA and Leaves of Absence as Reasonable Accommodation for a
Disability Under FEHA, 43 S.F. ATT’Y, Winter 2017, at 54, 57. Although the author focuses
on California-specific employee rights, the author’s suggestion that the employer simply
“do more” is still vague. Id. Employers can only do more when they know what more there is
to do; employees should play a more dominant role in initiating the interactive process.
See infra Section IV.B.1.
227. See infra Section III.C.2.
228. See infra Section IV.A.
229. See infra Section III.C.3.
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1. Other Approaches Fail to Clarify the Interactive Process’s Trigger
Academics and practicing attorneys have taken some momentous first
steps toward defining what should trigger the interactive process. However,
these suggestions have delved too far into complicated factors tests230 and
public education ploys231 rather than simplifying the interactive process.
Other recommended solutions, such as documenting meetings with employees,
training management, and mediation, also fail to proactively protect mentally
disabled employees.
Some commentators have suggested that a factors test232 might help
guide employers in determining whether the interactive process has been
triggered.233 However, this approach just adds more facts to an already
fact-intensive inquiry.234 Moreover, a factors test is a backward-looking
approach; it presumes that litigation has already ensued.235 The goal of the
ADA, however, is not just to vindicate previously wronged employees.236
The goal of the ADA is to protect disabled employees in the workplace
without going to court.237
Other commentators have recommended educating employers about
their responsibilities under the ADA.238 “Education” presumes, however,
that there is a concrete topic about which employers can be educated. Currently,
employer obligations under an interactive process are so complicated and
contradictory that education cannot do the job; this approach depends on
230. See, e.g., Fierro, supra note 143, at 425, 437 (suggesting a three-factor test for
determining whether an employer should restore employment for an ADA-covered employee
whose termination was due to behavior resulting from an unknown mental disability).
231. See, e.g., Curtis D. Edmonds, Lowering the Threshold: How Far Has the Americans
with Disabilities Act Expanded Access to the Courts in Employment Litigation?, 26 J.L. &
POL’Y 1, 27 (2018) (“[E]ducation about the ADAAA provisions for judges, practitioners,
and plaintiffs is seriously warranted.”).
232. Factors tests are commonly used in employment and labor law cases because
the workplace varies tremendously from industry to industry, location to location, and manager
to manager. For example, courts use factors tests to determine whether a worker or volunteer
worker is an employee covered under federal employment laws. See, e.g., Juino v. Livingston
Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 434–35 (5th Cir. 2013).
233. See, e.g., Fierro, supra note 143, at 425.
234. See Stanley Santire, The Road to Reasonable Accommodation in Dealing with
Employees with Special Needs, 55 HOUS. LAW., Jan.–Feb. 2018, at 12, 12 (“For lawyers
dealing with disability discrimination claims, the adventure is dealing with ADA rights and
obligations and coping with challenging terms like ‘disability’ and ‘reasonable accommodation.’
The clearest guide on that road is to keep in mind that just as each employee claiming a
disability is a unique human being, the circumstances are different for each employer from
whom an accommodation is claimed.”).
235. See infra Section III.C.3.
236. See supra Section II.B.
237. See supra Section II.B.
238. See, e.g., Edmonds, supra note 231, at 27 (“[E]ducation about the ADAAA provisions
for judges, practitioners, and plaintiffs is seriously warranted.”).
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an erroneous assumption that the ADA’s interactive process is a simple
process.239 Education and outreach are only effective when there are clear
regulations and expectations in place.240 Before government agencies can
implement the educational approach, the interactive process trigger needs
to be clarified.241
Others suggest that employers document any interactions with employees
to protect against potential lawsuits. Without a statutory overhaul,
documentation may be the best an employer can do.242 Failing to document
the stages of the interactive process, such as discussions about potential
reasonable accommodations, is generally considered a “trap” among
practitioners.243 Although this may be accurate, this Comment looks at what
is best for both the employer, as well as the employee. Additionally, an employer
can only document the interactive process once it knows the process has
been triggered.244 Instead, the best defense for employers, and the best course
of action for employees, would be to require a clear disclosure so that both
parties know that the interactive process has been triggered.245

239. See supra Section III.A.2.
240. Neither employees nor employers are mind readers. Both need clear guidelines
so that they know what is expected of them. This is why employers, and not just employees,
need clear guidance in the workplace, especially when any deviations may result in employer
liability. See KEN BLANCHARD & GARRY RIDGE, HELPING PEOPLE WIN AT WORK: A
BUSINESS PHILOSOPHY CALLED “DON’T MARK MY PAPER, HELP ME GET AN A” 97 (2009)
(“All good performance starts with clear goals. If people don’t know what they’re supposed to
accomplish, how can they possibly [excel]?”).
241. See infra Section IV.B.1.
242. See, e.g., Maria Danaher, Employee’s Failure to Engage in Interactive Process
Supports Dismissal of ADA Claim, EMP.L. MATTERS (May 15, 2017), https://www.employmentlaw
matters.net/2017/05/articles/ada/employees-failure-actively-engage-interactive-processsupports-dismissal-ada-claim/ [https://perma.cc/HWM6-3UGN] (“The instructive value
of this opinion to employers is clear: the success of [the employer] in this case is based
upon . . . documentation, which relied on job descriptions, statements from the [employer’s]
HR department and [the employee’s] own unchanging statements regarding her concern
over [essential job functions].”).
243. See, e.g., Scott M. Abbott, Five ADA Traps for Employers to Avoid, 24 NEV.
LAW., Jan. 2016, at 12, 14 (“[D]ocumentation is an employer’s best defense to a ‘failure
to accommodate’ complaint.”). This article seems to suggest that employers are trying to
get away with something and that documentation proves they engaged in the interactive
process. See id. This Comment, in contrast, suggests that an employer’s “best defense” would
be to follow the interactive process once the employee explicitly triggers the process. See
infra Section IV.B.1.
244. See infra Section IV.B.1.
245. See infra Section IV.B.1.
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Some previously proposed solutions involve implementing management
training to identify mental health disabilities and directing identified employees
toward treatment.246 However, this approach risks regarded as liability.247
For example, some employer-required tests allow employers to predict,
often successfully, whether an employee has a mental disability.248 Yet,
it is debatable whether employers are legally allowed to offer these tests
to candidates as well.249 Additionally, post-offer screening may also lead
to employer liability.250
Other commentators have suggested mediation to help with the interactive
process.251 In fact, this approach might be an ideal guide for the interactive
process.252 For example, this approach will help ensure proper documentation.253
Mediation is also very flexible, so it should give employers and employees
ample opportunity to discover the best reasonable accommodation for
each employee.254 However, mediation does not address what triggers the
interactive process.255 This approach presumes that the interactive process

246. See, e.g., Ballard & Henry, supra note 86, at 62.
247. See supra Section II.C.2.
248. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 92 (discussing the screening tests and the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) test).
249. Id. at 92. For a 1992 argument in favor of employer testing, see David W. Arnold
and Alan J. Thiemann, To Test or Not to Test: The Status of Psychological Testing Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 6 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 503, 503–06 (1992).
250. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 93.
251. See, e.g., Katheryn E. Miller, Mediating the Interactive Process, 46 COLO. LAW.,
May 2017, at 35, 37 (“Mediation is a uniquely suited interactive process that offers the
parties optimal solutions. Mediation as the interactive process can alleviate . . . difficulties
to the benefit of all parties.”).
252. See id. (“A trained third-party neutral facilitates the conversation, which emphasizes
sharing and clarifying information. It is a flexible process where the parties can safely explore
options to maximize outcomes.”).
253. See id. at 38. Mediation helps ensure documentation for a number of reasons:
Through mediation, the interactive process will be well documented by the mediator.
There will not be a question as to whether the interactive process occurred. The process
is designed to maximize the opportunity to find a reasonable accommodation that both the
employer and the employee find to be reasonable. The employer’s concerns about hardship
can be vetted without fear of allegations of discrimination, and the employee can raise his
or her fears, including those of retaliation, knowing that the concerns will be addressed.
Id.
254. See id. (“The process is flexible. It should be approached in a collaborative
manner. How long it takes depends on the issues presented. It can take a couple of hours,
multiple sessions, or several months. It depends on [the] availability of information and complexity
of the issues. The mediator can assist the employer to track and obtain missing information
and set deadlines for moving through the process.”).
255. Mediation presumes that a dispute already exists. See JENNIFER E. BEER & CAROLINE
C. PACKARD, THE MEDIATOR’S HANDBOOK 3 (rev. & expanded 4th ed. 2012).
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has already been triggered because mediation postulates that an issue or
dispute is recognized by both opposing parties.256
Thus, Congress should amend the ADA257 to ensure that ADA-protected
employees get the reasonable accommodations they need without jumping
through hoops that could otherwise include: navigating intricate factors tests,
meeting with management who lack adequate knowledge of the ADA, signing
unnecessary paperwork just so that the company has “documentation,” being
constantly studied by “trained” supervisors, or sitting through a mediation
process after the employer has failed to offer the employee reasonable
accommodations.
2. The EEOC’s Limited Role
Some commentators look to the original draft of the ADAAA to conclude
that courts should defer to the EEOC’s guidance.258 This historical approach
recognizes that Congress created the EEOC, and enacted the ADA, to ensure
a broad range of protection in the workplace.259 Although a court may give
the EEOC’s guidelines considerable weight because Congress gave the

256. Id.
257. See infra Section IV.B.
258. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 7, at 1520. “Congress could clarify that it did not
intend courts to defer to an employer’s judgment. . . . Congress could clarify its intent that
the EEOC has authority to issue regulations with the force of law.” Id. at 1514.
259. See id. at 1520. Congress was concerned that the foundations of the American
workplace excluded persons with disabilities:
People with disabilities were measured against benchmarks of productivity. The
modern factory not only caused disabilities, but it mass-produced notions of
difference as inferior and impairments as damning. It is from this period that
many modern conceptions of ideal or normal workers were drawn. Current
oppression of people with disabilities is thus connected all the way back to the
birth of the modern American workplace.
Id. at 1521 (quoting Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable
Accommodation and Resistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 97
(2008)). Successful employee stereotypes were centered only around persons without
disabilities:
Indeed, the ideal worker is one who performs the job in the precise way that the
employer has mandated, even if there are other ways of accomplishing this task
that do not impose an undue hardship on the employer. But this ideal worker is
the very norm the ADA intended to challenge.
Id. at 1521–22.
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agency the authority to issue regulations implementing the ADA, courts
are actually not bound by any EEOC guidelines.260
Granting judicial deference may give the EEOC more autonomy over
the enforcement process.261 However, this approach disregards the fact that
the EEOC already has limited resources and that a shift in enforcement
practices may overwhelm the agency.262 As some authors note, the EEOC
already has limited resources.263 Instead, the EEOC should remain an
enforcement agency.264 The agency is not intended to be a legislative body
or an extension of the judicial branch.265
Allowing the EEOC to stay focused on enforcement, rather than legislation,
will better maintain the integrity of the ADA.266 Encouraging disclosure
by requiring it as an element in failure to accommodate claims better conserves
government resources and promotes judicial economy.267 In other words,
this scheme allows the EEOC to allocate its resources to compel compliance
only against intentional failures to accommodate.268 Additionally, this
260. See Ballard & Henry, supra note 86, at 35. Courts occasionally give the EEOC
Chevron deference. See, e.g., Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562,
573 (4th Cir. 2015) (giving deference to EEOC’s inclusion of interacting with others as a
major life activities on its regulatory list). For an in-depth look at varying levels of judicial
deference, see Eric Dreiband & Blake Pulliam, Deference to EEOC Rulemaking and SubRegulatory Guidance: A Flip of the Coin?, 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. LAW 93, 94–98 (2016).
261. Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Less Is More: Procedural Efficacy in Vindicating Civil
Rights, 68 ALA. L. REV. 49, 61 (2016) (“On one hand, substituting administrative enforcement
for judicial enforcement gives the agency control over the claims and issues pursued.”).
262. Id. at 62 (“Or they may all make the same choice—for example, if everyone
chooses an administrative remedy over a judicial remedy, disastrous consequences may
ensue if the agency is not equipped to handle every claim. Moreover, if claimants are not
forced to choose, and instead are allowed to pursue simultaneous administrative and judicial
remedies, serious questions arise regarding the efficiency and wastefulness of duplicative
enforcement actions.”).
263. See Hickox & Hall, supra note 191, at 62 (describing the EEOC as having very
limited resources); Shinall, supra note 261, at 52 (“The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the federal agency in charge of administering employment discrimination
charges, is notoriously underfunded, [which] result[s] in a backlog of cases, long wait times for
charge investigation, and fewer resources for the agency to litigate claims in the public
interest.”).
264. Shinall, supra note 261, at 59 (“Most of the scholarly concerns raised regarding
the agency, however, are structural in nature. These arguments contend that even if Congress
were more generous with the EEOC’s funding, fundamental flaws would remain in the design
of employment discrimination law enforcement.”).
265. See id. at 60 (“Many scholars have lamented the EEOC’s lack of adjudicative
authority, but how much adjudicative authority the agency should have remains a source
of debate.”).
266. See supra Section III.B.
267. See infra Section IV.B.1. For a brief explanation of the EEOC’s involvement
in ADA claims, see also Kristi Bleyer, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Enforcement
Mechanisms, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 347, 347–48 (1992).
268. See supra Section III.B.
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approach would streamline cases because it reduces the number of causes
of action that a plaintiff, or the EEOC, may file.269
3. Proactive Versus Reactive Solutions
Finally, the biggest problem with the ambiguous trigger of the interactive
process and its previously proposed solutions is that the current legal
mechanisms in place are reactive and not proactive measures.270 Courts
are generally seen as “holders of residual lawmaking and reactive law
enforcement powers.”271 In response to gaps in statutory law, legislatures
may direct enforcement agencies and regulators to issue their own guidelines.272
Although this approach helps patch the holes in the legal framework, it is
still not proactive law because enforcement agencies do just that—enforce.
Enforcing a law is reactive.273 Proactive law focuses on guaranteeing statutorily
protected rights without going to court.274 Proactive law encourages clear
regulations that are easy to follow so that all parties involved preserve
statutorily protected rights.275
To better effectuate the policy goals of the ADA,276 Congress should
include disclosure as an element of failure to accommodate claims.277 By
requiring disclosure as an element, employees must have disclosed to their
employer that they have a disability before they can bring failure to
accommodate claims.278 By requiring disclosure as an element during the
269. Generally, claim preclusion promotes judicial economy. See Mitchell N. Berman,
Note, Removal and the Eleventh Amendment: The Case for District Court Remand Discretion
To Avoid a Bifurcated Suit, 92 MICH. L. REV. 683, 715 n.186 (1993).
270. See generally Pistor & Xu, supra note 214.
271. Id. at 1012.
272. See id. at 932. “[A] law [is] complete if a law enacted today unambiguously
stipulates for all future contingencies; otherwise a law is incomplete.” Id. Legislatures may
draft “incomplete law” for a variety of reasons, including bad drafting, inability to adapt
to socioeconomic and technological advancements, the existence of other previously enacted
laws, or a lack of resources. Id. at 932–33.
273. See id. at 935 (“Courts are designed to be reactive law enforcers.”).
274. Id.
275. See id. Proactive law can be issued by regulators. Id.
276. See supra Section III.B.
277. See infra Section IV.B.1.
278. Currently, plaintiffs are not required to show that they have disclosed mental
disabilities to their employers in failure to accommodate claims. See supra Section II.C.1.
Instead, a plaintiff may let the jury draw an inference that the employer had a reason to
know that the plaintiff had a mental disability that requires a reasonable accommodation.
See supra Section II.C.1.
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trial—the reactive phase of the ADA—employees will disclose and explicitly
trigger the interactive process far before going to court—during the proactive
phase of the ADA. Thus, in the best case scenario, trial would be avoided
because employers have an opportunity to accommodate their employee.
Additionally, discouraging regarded as claims filed alongside failure to
accommodate claims will coax employers to engage in the interactive process
in good faith for as long as necessary to find a reasonable accommodation
for employees.279 By adjusting the elements in failure to accommodate
claims, the ADA becomes a more proactive law, and protects employees
without entering the courtroom.280
In sum, today’s employers are increasingly more likely to hire an ADAprotected employee and then find themselves hesitant to offer reasonable
accommodations without a clear trigger from employees.281 Employees
are increasingly bringing both failure to accommodate and regarded as
discrimination claims.282 Unfortunately, these trends show that employees
are still dissatisfied with their employment opportunities under the ADA
because they have not received the reasonable accommodations that they
need to be successful.283 Alternatively, they have been discriminated against
when an employer concludes they may have a disability for fear of liability
for failing to offer reasonable accommodations.284 The fact that plaintiffs
are bringing either of these claims to court shows that ADA-protected
employees are still not receiving the full benefits of equal opportunities in
the workplace.285 This result frustrates the purpose of the ADA and leaves
employees with only reactive solutions for vindication. It is time for
Congress to amend the ADA with today’s trends in mind.
IV. PROPOSALS: CONGRESS SHOULD REQUIRE EXPLICIT EMPLOYEE
DISCLOSURE TO TRIGGER THE INTERACTIVE PROCESS
AND LIMIT ALTERNATIVE PLEADING
IN ADA CLAIMS
Congress should amend the ADA in two ways. First, failure to accommodate
claims should require employees to have explicitly disclosed a mental
disability to the employer.286 Second, Congress should disallow regarded

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
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See infra Section IV.B.2.
See Pistor & Xu, supra note 214, at 935.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Sections III.A.3, II.C.2.
See supra Sections III.A.3, II.C.1.
See supra Sections III.A.3, II.C.2.
See supra Section III.B.
See infra Section IV.B.1.
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as discrimination claims to be alternatively pleaded with failure to
accommodate claims.287
A. Congressional Leadership
Congress should pass legislation that helps promote disclosure because
federal law is a uniform way to guarantee equal rights in the workplace
for mentally disabled employees.288 Additionally, legislating is Congress’s
job; lawmaking is not an enforcement agency’s job.289 Writing the
amendment will do more than create law—it will create policy.290 Thus,
Congress needs to take a role in the ADA amendment process because
Congress’s job is to “mak[e] good policy for the nation.”291 Furthermore,
because the ADA includes rather ambitious policy goals, Congress should
take responsibility for amending the ADA.292
Although the 2008 amendments have furthered the ADA’s policy goals
of offering mentally disabled employees legal protections in the workplace,293
those protections are only leveraged after a failure to accommodate or
postdiscrimination.294 With the influx of mental disability diagnoses, the
likelihood that an employer will employ a person with a mental disability
is very high.295 Thus, Congress should furnish employers with the tools they
need to ensure their employees enjoy equal opportunities in the workplace.
B. Proposed ADA Amendments
Congress can make two simple adjustments to the ADA. First, Congress
should amend the ADA to require employee disclosure as an element in
failure to accommodate claims. Disclosure would thus explicitly trigger
the interactive process and give employers an opportunity to find a reasonable
287. See infra Section IV.B.2.
288. See Long, Divergent Interpretations, supra note 46, at 478 (“In short, federal
law has traditionally set the standard for individual rights in the employment context, with
state legislatures and courts taking their cues from federal law.”).
289. See Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress, 76 MO. L. REV.
135, 139 (2011) (“Lawmaking is the most primary, fundamental part of a legislator’s job.”).
290. See id. at 140–41. “A responsible legislator must learn both [policymaking and
lawmaking].” Id. at 141.
291. Id. at 143.
292. See id.
293. See supra Sections II.A.2, III.B.
294. See supra Section III.C.3.
295. See supra Section III.A.1.
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accommodation for their employees instead of learning about a disability
upon the filing of a lawsuit. Although this type of approach may infringe
on privacy law,296 the ADA’s policy goals of guaranteeing employee
workplace opportunities far outweigh any such concerns.297
Second, Congress should limit alternative pleading in failure to accommodate
claims so as to bar pleading both regarded as discrimination and failure to
accommodate causes of action. This amendment will encourage employers
to engage in the interactive process and guarantee reasonable accommodations
for employees without entering a courtroom.298 Additionally, encouraging
disclosure by barring regarded as claims may help diffuse stigma about
mental disabilities because so much of the population is or will be diagnosed
with a mental disability within their lifetimes.299 Congress should encourage
the employee to play a larger role in requests for accommodation by requiring
employee disclosure that triggers the interactive process.300
1. Employee Disclosure of Disability Should Be an Element of
Failure to Accommodate Claims
Granted, requiring disclosure of a mental disability diagnosis, its symptoms,
and treatment, threatens privacy law.301 However, encouraging disclosure
would not infringe on privacy rights. Congress can encourage disclosure
by requiring disclosure as an element in failure to accommodate claims.
This means that employees are not required to divulge a mental diagnosis
if they choose; however, they would be unable to sue an employer for failure
to accommodate. Disclosure here is meant to facilitate the interactive process
and ensure that mentally disabled employees get the reasonable accommodations
that they need and deserve under the ADA.302 Encouraging disclosure will
296. See Jennifer Mathis, Mental Health Privacy: Do Inquiring Minds Really Need
to Know?, 41 HUM. RTS. 10, 10 (2016).
297. The majority of public policy cases compare “the private arrangement of citizens as
equal to public arrangements and tries to strike a balance between the two.” Farshad
Ghodoosi, The Concept of Public Policy in Law: Revisiting the Role of the Public Policy
Doctrine in the Enforcement of Private Legal Arrangements, 94 NEB. L. REV. 685, 689
(2016).
298. See supra Section III.C.3.
299. This Comment disagrees with the suggestion that sharing medical information
with decision-makers “perpetuate[s] prejudice and deter[s] individuals from seeking help.”
Mathis, supra note 208, at 10.
300. See infra Section IV.B.1.
301. See Mathis, supra note 208, at 10 (“The last several years have brought an
unusual number of public calls to change privacy rules to permit or require greater disclosure
of individuals’ mental health information—including details about their symptoms, diagnoses,
history, and/or treatment.”).
302. This Comment does not address any link between mental disability and violence,
nor does it contest the premise that disclosure fails to facilitate safer work environments.
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help make employees with mental disabilities part of the solution—not
part of the problem.303
Persons with mental disabilities may not realize how failing to disclose
a medical condition actually impairs their job performance and career
opportunities. 304 When an employer already presumes an employee’s
underperformance is not medically related, an employer may be less inclined
to initiate any dialogue about improving job performance.305 This inhibits
career development and infringes upon crucial professional relationships
that lead to advancement in the workplace.306 Disclosure will also help
prevent employers from perceiving an employee’s disability as a disingenuous

See Mathis, supra note 208, at 11. Admittedly, there may be occasions when persons with
disabilities may instigate workplace violence—but this is rarely because of the disability:
[R]ecent proposals to permit or require greater scrutiny of individuals’ mental
health information are poorly suited to accomplish their asserted goal of preventing
violent or dangerous conduct. Studies have shown repeatedly that mental illness
is a very poor predictor of future violence. Indeed, only about four percent of
violence is attributable to individuals with mental illness, and even in those rare
instances when such individuals do engage in violence, it is frequently other risk
factors, such as co-occurring substance use disorders, rather than the symptoms
of mental illness, that cause the conduct.
Id. Rather, this Comment focuses on leveraging disclosure as a way to unequivocally
trigger the interactive process and help mentally disabled employees get the reasonable
accommodations that they need to be successful in the workplace. See supra Section III.C.3.
303. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 102 (“It is conventional wisdom that the easiest
kind of value to see is the kind you are used to seeing. By taking a broader perspective and
recognizing the value in employees who think and approach problem solving differently,
employers will simultaneously benefit themselves and people with [autism spectrum
disorder (ASD)].”).
304. Miller, supra note 251, at 37. Failing to request a reasonable accommodation
can hurt an employee’s career prospects:
Employees often lack understanding and awareness of their rights. Fear of retaliation
or stigma deters requests for accommodation. Although medical conditions are
entitled to confidentiality, breach of confidentiality is common, and anxiety can
exist over perceived or actual hostility from supervisors and coworkers. Although
delay in treatment and accommodation can lead to a decline in condition, job
performance, and work relationships, this is often exactly what happens. Employee
advocates wait too long to get involved.
Id.
305. See id. (“All of these circumstances can erode trust and lead to deterioration in
the supervisor-employee relationship. As the situation spirals downward, the options for
finding a reasonable accommodation dissipate. Positions harden and personal resentment
grows on both sides.”).
306. See id. (“The employee may end up blaming the company or the supervisor, while
the company ends up wanting to get rid of the ‘problem employee.’”).
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excuse, rather than a legitimate mental disability covered under the ADA.307
Furthermore, these barriers may actually aggravate an employee’s existing
condition.308
Currently, the ADA’s disclosure requirements are quite limited.309
Employers can only ask about disabilities and diagnoses once a job offer
has been extended, and those inquiries are limited to whether the candidate
can perform the essential functions of the job.310 Additionally, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) only authorizes
disclosure in extremely limited situations, such as in emergencies.311
Furthermore, requiring disclosure to plead failure to accommodate may
actually help ensure a diverse workforce and reduce negative stigmas about
mentally disabled employees.312 By teaching employees about tolerance,
307. See Steve Metzger & Nancy Leonard, The Americans with Disabilities Act After
a Quarter Century, 34 ACC DOCKET 46, 49–50 (2016). Persons with disabilities can protect
their work reputations by disclosing early:
Employees who cannot find it in themselves to report to work and perform their
jobs in a minimally satisfactory manner will go to great lengths to protect themselves
from the consequences of their behavior. Notably, if some of those employees
devoted the same kind of energy and attention to coming to work and doing their
jobs, they would[] [not] be on the progressive discipline track in the first place.
One such method of self-preservation involves a sudden announcement by the
employee that he has a medical condition, usually of a psychological or emotional
nature, that was, to that point, unknown to the employer and often to the employee
himself. The announcement usually comes toward the end of the progressive
discipline process and, sometimes, even after the employee has been advised of his
impending termination. The employee has now cloaked himself with the protections
of the ADA in an effort to stop the termination. The employee sometimes will
point to the alleged medical condition as the cause of the poor performance or
unacceptable behavior. Often, though, the employee merely makes the announcement
in the hope that the existence of a disability will be enough to stop the termination.
The play sounds something like this—“I was on step four of the progressive
disciplinary policy and the next step was termination. I told Big Company that I
had post traumatic stress disorder and that my inappropriate behavior toward
my supervisor was caused by the condition. Two days later I was fired. I was
fired because I told Big Company that I had a disability.”
Id.
308. Miller, supra note 251, at 37 (“As stress increases, the employee’s medical condition
can worsen, further complicating the situation.”).
309. See Mathis, supra note 208, at 12 (“The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
HIPAA, and other laws already provide sufficient latitude for employers, licensing bodies,
families, and regulators to review individuals’ mental health information in situations where it
is actually relevant.”).
310. Id.
311. See id.
312. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 101–02 (“There is no question that the next decade
will see increasing numbers of individuals with ASD applying for jobs and working in the
labor force. Whether or not they experience success will be highly dependent on the actions of
employers and their compliance with federal anti-discrimination laws. Employers must
structure the hiring and interview process to eliminate unnecessary barriers to people with
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employers would play a vital role in promoting the ADA’s policy goals
of ensuring equal opportunities in the workplace, as well as leverage a
best practice.313
Moreover, maintaining confidentiality may actually hurt an employee’s
or applicant’s integration into the workplace.314 Although not necessary
under this Comment’s proposed solution, keeping coworkers involved in
the reasonable accommodation process may actually lead to better acceptance
and equality in the workplace.315 This is because “[p]eople usually are more
receptive to an idea if they contributed to its development.”316 This
collaborative approach will lead to more open communication between
colleagues.317 Furthermore, this approach would likely result in increased
employee satisfaction and higher productivity.318
autism that are unrelated to the position in question. The law requires employers to engage
in an interactive process and provide the reasonable accommodations that are necessary to
enable these workers to succeed. Employers also must carefully consider how to structure
the workplace environment to enable employees with autism to meet conduct rules and
expectations. In light of the more expansive definition of disability under the ADAAA,
employers who ignore such mandates will be exposed to legal liability in the future. It
is critical to recognize that employers’ legal compliance in this regard has the potential to
benefit both employees with ASD and their employers. Individuals with ASD bring very
real strengths to the table and have the potential to be significant assets to employers who
invest in their training and development. . . . Hiring this population may also lead to increased
business and goodwill from consumers. One study found that almost all consumers would
‘prefer to give their business to companies that employ people with disabilities.’” (citing
Gary N. Siperstein et al., A National Survey of Consumer Attitudes Toward Companies
that Hire People with Disabilities, 24 J. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 3, 6 (2006))).
313. See id. at 97.
314. Rose A. Daly-Rooney, Designing Reasonable Accommodations Through Co-Worker
Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Confidentiality Provision of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 89, 90 (1993).
315. Id. at 92.
316. Id. at 100.
317. Id. at 102.
318. See Porter, supra note 48, at 262–63 (“Although this next finding is fairly
obvious, it still bears mentioning. The study found that employees who had their
accommodations granted had better attitudes about the workplace. They had higher
perceptions of organizational support and higher job satisfaction. Furthermore, granting
accommodations seemed to have a positive spillover effect on other employees. Both
employees with and without disabilities reported various positive effects because of
accommodations given. Almost half of both groups of employees reported that the
accommodations have improved the employees’ interactions with coworkers. Other benefits
reported included improved productivity, greater employee retention, improved morale
and job satisfaction, decreased employee stress at work, improved employee attendance,
improved workplace safety, improved employee ability to acquire training or new skills,
and greater ability for the company to promote a qualified employee.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Many academics consider a candidate or employee’s voluntary disclosure
of any disability to be disadvantageous,319 which stems from disability
bias in the United States and may be “particularly true for individuals with
mental impairments, given the strong history of stigma against this group.”320
As a result, many persons with disabilities refrain from any disclosure.321
However, this Comment’s proposed solution puts the employer on notice
and shifts the employer’s focus from wondering whether an employee is
disabled and in need of an accommodation to proactively interacting with
the employee and doing what is best for the employee.322 Engaging in the
interactive process early on is an economically efficient approach to ensuring
workplace equality.323 This approach should alleviate any additional stress
the employee may bear and shift the burden of initiating the interactive
process to the employer.324 Furthermore, this approach will also usher in
an era of stronger tolerance for fellow employees.325
Additionally, reducing mental health privacy will actually help employees
attain greater autonomy in the workplace because it will put employers on
notice and explicitly trigger the interactive process.326 Some authors suggest
that the current burdens associated with ADA claims put employees on trial
twice.327 However, requiring disclosure may actually reduce the number
319. E.g., Hensel, supra note 7, at 87.
320. Id.
321. See generally id. at 89.
322. See id. at 88 (suggesting that disclosure helps explain an autistic candidate’s
“patchwork quilt” résumé). “In light of this reality, employers in many respects are better
off if the employee discloses upfront. With disclosure, the focus more quickly moves from
an emphasis on disability to one of ability.” Id. at 90.
323. See Olsen, supra note 7, at 1518 (“[T]his approach could avoid the expense and
time involved in litigation over failure to accommodate claims, even if the employer would
ultimately prevail on summary judgment.” (citing Amy Knapp, Comment, The Danger of
the “Essential Functions” Requirement of the ADA: Why the Interactive Process Should Be
Mandated, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 715, 728 (2013))).
324. See id. at 1518–19 (“Thus, both from an employer’s perspective and with the
goal of reaching the reasonable accommodation analysis, the reasonable accommodation
requirement should be an earlier and more robust process. That is, constructive knowledge
should be sufficient to initiate the duty to reasonably accommodate.”).
325. See id. at 1519 (“[S]ensitivities towards the disabled community in the workplace
must change. The purpose of the ADA and the ADAAA is to emphasize that an individual’s
right to participate in society does not diminish simply by virtue of her disabilities.”).
326. But see Mathis, supra note 296, at 13 (“Reducing mental health privacy helps no
one.”).
327. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 7, at 1498 (“First, the employee caries the burden of
proving she is qualified. Second, courts defer to the employer’s judgment as to the employee’s
qualified status. This process puts the plaintiff’s disabled status on trial for a second time—the
first being the court’s determination of whether she is indeed disabled—which frustrates
congressional intent to create broad protections for people with disabilities.”); see also
Santire, supra note 234, at 13 (“Beyond showing proof of disability, the employee, or the
applicant for employment, must show qualification for the job regardless of the impairment.
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of plaintiffs that need to endure that two-step trial because it will give
employers an opportunity to engage in the interactive process and find a
reasonable accommodation for the employee. Thus, with a reasonable
accommodation, an ADA-protected employee will be better positioned to
meet—or exceed—expectations and enjoy a flourishing career.328
Moreover, disclosure may actually promote a fundamental principle of
public interest law: “Representation of the unrepresented and the
underrepresented.”329 This principle is only observed when law protects
a minority’s statutorily protected rights.330 Thus, the ADA’s goals are
actually to guarantee the rights of persons with mental disabilities—not to
compensate those individuals retroactively for having suffered discrimination.331
Furthermore, disclosure aligns with a common perception of justice: the
“justice as fairness” theory.332 The justice as fairness theory focuses on how
a diverse community “decide[s] once and for all what is to count among

This is a two-step process. First, the individual must have the requisite skill, experience,
education and other requirements for the relevant job. . . . [T]he second step is to prove or
demonstrate an ability to perform the essential job functions with or without reasonable
accommodation.”).
328. A job is not the same as a career. Rather, a career is a series of jobs that is personally
rewarding, involves development and not just training, and “require[s] a high degree of
commitment.” Joy E. Pixley, Differentiating Careers from Jobs in the Search for DualCareer Couples, 52 SOC. PERSP. 363, 364 (2009). Additionally, because employers benefit
from long-term employees and low turnover, a pique in organizational behavior has led to
increased interest in “job design theory.” Job design theory aims to create “stimulating
jobs [that] are associated with motivating psychological states that contribute to favorable
attitudinal and behavior work outcomes.” Yitzhak Fried et al., Job Design in Temporal Context:
A Career Dynamics Perspective, 28 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 911, 911 (2007). For an
examination of typical career paths, see generally Rachel A. Rosenfeld, Job Mobility and
Career Processes, 18 ANN. REV. SOC. 39 (1992). A key reason to differentiate between jobs
and careers is that careers are associated with more pay. See Pixley, supra (“Careers [are]
also seen as offering high levels of extrinsic rewards, especially income.”). Higher pay is
important here because the ADA aims to give mentally disabled individuals economic
independence. See Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial
Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 53 (2000)
(“Central to [the legislature’s] enthusiasm was a belief that the new Act would promote
the independence and economic self-sufficiency of millions of people with disabilities.”).
329. David R. Esquivel, Note, The Identity Crisis in Public Interest Law, 46 DUKE
L.J. 327, 328 (1996).
330. See id. (“Representation involved the defense of another’s interests.”).
331. See id. at 329 (“[P]rocedure-based conceptions of justice fail to provide an adequate
framework for public interest law because the pursuit of a substantively better society is an
essential component of any movement for legal reform or enforcement of pre-existing rights.”).
332. Id. at 330.
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them as just and unjust.”333 This collaborative approach mirrors the democratic
processes required for community buy-in334 in a diverse society.335 Thus,
public interest law suggests achieving equal opportunity in the workplace
requires a collaborative approach that endorses employee disclosure.336
Moreover, this approach will ensure that employees see the proactive benefits
of the ADA—receiving reasonable accommodations—rather than defaulting
to the ADA’s reactive solutions—heading to court.
2. Failure to Accommodate Claims Should Not Be Alternatively
Pleaded with Regarded As Claims
Employee disclosure could actually be disadvantageous for an employer
—not an employee.337 This is because an “[e]mployers’ early knowledge
of disability, particularly one linked to interpersonal deficits, strengthens
the ability of the applicant to qualify for class membership under the
‘regarded as’ prong of the ADA should litigation ensue.”338 This is particularly
troubling because even without disclosure or accommodation request, courts
have found that an employee’s “odd” behavior “was sufficient to give notice
of an individual’s disability and need for accommodation.”339
Thus, a congressional bar against pleading both a failure to accommodate
claim and a regarded as discrimination claim will promote judicial economy.340
In other words, disclosure will explicitly trigger the interactive process and
make the issue of whether the employer knew or should have known about
the employee’s mental disability easier to investigate, which will help eliminate
frivolous claims at summary judgment.341 Moreover, this approach undermines
333. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 207 (1971). For a brief discussion of John
Rawls’s potential influence on modern political theory, see also Brooke Ackerly, John Rawls:
An Introduction, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 75, 75–78 (2006).
334. Effective management requires employee buy-in. See John Adler & Jay Youngdahl,
The Odd Couple: Wall Street, Union Benefits, and the Looting of the American Worker,
19 NEW LAB. F. 80, 84 (2010) (“An effective organizational structure—with buy-in across
the labor movement—must be developed, which clarifies the true effects of labor’s present
activity . . . .”).
335. See Esquivel, supra note 329, at 331.
336. For a brief history of equal opportunity laws in the United States, see Joshua E.
Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 485–89 (2014).
337. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 89.
338. Id.
339. Id. “This may be a particularly persuasive argument in cases in which the employee’s
disorder affect her ability to engage in meaningful communication.” Id.
340. For a closer look at the interplay of judicial economy and the floodgates argument,
see generally Toby J. Stern, Comment, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of
Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 377–79, 420–21 (2003).
341. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 315
(1999) (“Today’s caseloads make it a question of some moment whether judges legitimately
may consider caseload effects when deciding a case.”).
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any “floodgates” argument because this statutory change would not establish
a new right, it would only change the way a right is enforced.342
In sum, if employees learn that they are unable to alternatively plead both
failure to accommodate and regarded as claims, they may feel compelled
to take action in the workplace and speak to the employer rather than waiting
for litigation to remediate their ADA-protected rights to reasonable
accommodations. As more mentally disabled employees join the workforce,
Congress should give employers the tools they need to best accommodate
their new employees. Otherwise, the ADA, nearly thirty years old, is still
ineffective. Without these minor, imperative adjustments to the ADA,
employees will only find redemption retroactively—through litigation—and
remain unable to enjoy the benefits of reasonable accommodations in the
workplace.
V. CONCLUSION
Title I of the ADA imposes an ambiguous interactive process on employers
because it does not put forth an explicit trigger. Because an employer may
face liability for failing to engage in the interactive process when it has a
reason to know that a mentally disabled employee needs a reasonable
accommodation, but may also face liability for regarding an employee as
disabled, employers are currently ensnared in an inescapable catch-22.
In considering mental, as opposed to physical, disabilities, this predicament
often leaves employers unprepared or unwilling to help these employees
because mental disabilities are not always obvious. An employer is less
likely to initiate the interactive process if it can be held liable for regarding
an employee as disabled when it triggers the interactive process. Because
a number of mental disabilities are not easily identifiable or communicable,
many employees are unable to benefit from the employer’s affirmative duty
to engage in the interactive process when an employer fears liability under
the regarded as prong of the ADA. Unfortunately, this means that as the
number of mental diagnoses steadily increases, employers will face inescapable
liability, and the ADA will continue failing to protect mentally disabled
employees.
Employers need better tools to help mentally disabled employees. This
Comment strives to raise awareness around the ADA’s ambiguous interactive
342. Stern, supra note 340, at 385–86 (“Thus the floodgates argument can appear in
many types of cases[] but tends to recur in those cases where a litigant seeks to establish
a new right or cause of action.”).
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process and proposes that Congress should require employee disclosure
as an element in failure to accommodate claims. Additionally, Congress
should bar the pleading of both failure to accommodate and regarded as
discrimination in the same suit. These changes will finally eliminate the
catch-22 and help achieve the important policy goals that the ADA set out
to accomplish: equal opportunity for our colleagues with mental disabilities.
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